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ABSTRACT 
 
Evolutionary psychology has recently developed out of dissatisfaction with the 
Standard Social Science Model utilised by mainstream psychology. This model 
focuses on culture and reason as the underlying cause of human behaviour and 
proposes that the mind is a „general purpose learning device‟ (Siegert & Ward, 
2002). Here the mind is seen as a blank slate at birth, which is subsequently 
influenced by experience, environment and culture. Biological variables are 
minimised or ignored. However it seems that all human behaviour cannot fully be 
explained by the focus on nurture in the Standard Social Science Model; sexual 
jealousy, parental investment, and mating preferences are examples which are not 
fully explained by learning or environmental experience. On the other hand, 
evolutionary psychology, founded on the principles of cognitive science and 
evolutionary biology, argues that a person‟s nature is the primary cause of their 
behaviour, with the influences of nurture being of lesser importance. According to 
these principles, evolutionary psychology has been very successful in providing 
explanations, for example in the areas of human mate selection and parental 
investment. However evolutionary psychology has received criticism on a number of 
counts, including its supposed reductionism, and, its reliance on „just so‟ stories 
which are untestable, hypothesised scenarios which look to the past in order to 
explain the evolution of human behavioural features.  
 
With the above mentioned matters as background, this thesis investigated whether 
evolutionary psychology offers a new paradigm for integrating psychology with 
science, and if so, how it accomplishes this. In investigating this, conceptions of 
science, psychology, and evolutionary theory, in particular evolutionary psychology, 
were examined. More specifically, issues addresses included why evolutionary 
psychology is dissatisfied with the SSSM, the notion of the mind as blank slate, the 
nature-nurture paradigm, and the mind as a general purpose learning device. Two 
aspects of evolutionary theory are described, natural and sexual selection, in terms 
 
 
 
 
 
of their importance to evolutionary psychology. The main arguments of evolutionary 
psychology as a discipline are outlined, looking at its aims, and the ways in which it 
combines the disciplines of evolutionary biology and cognitive psychology toward a 
new integrative model for studying human behaviour. A case study demonstrates 
how evolutionary psychology offers a useful explanation of mate selection. This 
thesis then turns to the philosophy of science, setting out the differences between 
Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos‟ theories, and focusing on the latter‟s theory as a 
model of scientific philosophy which could be useful for evolutionary psychology, 
including discussing how this could be best achieved. This thesis then sets out 
various criticisms of evolutionary psychology, including the critique of domain-
specific modularity, the focus on the Pleistocene period as problematic, the over-
reliance on natural selection, just-so stories, the reductionism of evolutionary 
psychology, and that it is politically conservative. This thesis concludes that the 
attempt of evolutionary psychology to combine cognitive science and evolutionary 
theory has been successful in showing how the integration of psychology into the 
sciences is not only possible but inevitable.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Human beings have evolved over millions of years in varying ecological 
conditions. Through evolutionary forces, we have developed characteristics that 
have been favourable to our continual reproduction as a species. Along this 
evolutionary journey, humans have been interested in understanding themselves 
and others. However, the field of psychology, as an attempt to study the human 
mind and behaviour, is a relatively recent discipline in the history of human 
understanding. Psychology originated from its intellectual affiliation with the 
discipline of philosophy (Ettinger, Crooks, & Stein, 1994; Lykken, 1991), yet just as 
the other sciences (e.g., astronomy, physics, chemistry, physiology) slowly broke 
away from the field of philosophy, so did psychology. Before these sciences broke 
away, philosophers speculated and reasoned about man and the arrangement of the 
universe (Baum, 1994). In many cases they employed assumptions about God or 
some other privileged source as the basis for their reasoning. However, the 
predominant reason for the split of psychology from philosophy can be linked to the 
rise of evolutionary theory (Buss, 1995). With Darwin‟s 1859 publication of The 
Origin of Species, the existence and role of God (or other privileged sources) in the 
account and creation of life was left out, and it was suggested that there were more 
scientific ways of approaching the problem. Toward the end of the 19th century, 
psychologists were faced with the problem of defining the „science of mind‟, because 
it was unclear how one should study the mind and its processes (Fodor, 1983). 
Some psychologists suggested that the philosophical technique of introspection 
ought to be used, however others were dissatisfied with the subjectivity of 
introspection, maintaining that as a scientific method it was unreliable and open to 
personal bias (Rosenberg, 2005). Other sciences, such as physics and chemistry, 
used objective methods and measurements which could be checked and replicated 
in laboratories. For example, experiments measured people‟s reaction times 
objectively and were thus seen as a great advance over introspection. Psychologists 
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could now do laboratory experiments with the same objective methods as the more 
reputable sciences. As Plotkin (1998) mentions, “psychology, at least in its origins, 
was modelled upon physiology in terms of being a laboratory science that seeks 
explanations of a particular kind” (p. 23). From around this time, the early 1900‟s, 
psychology turned away from evolutionary biology, and behaviourism then came to 
dominate the field of psychology until the 1970‟s (Buss, 1995). Behaviourism was 
perceived as a more scientific endeavour and stressed that human instinct was not a 
factor in explaining behaviour and that humans had no innate qualities. Instead 
learning was said to be the guiding principle of behaviour, and the environment was 
thought to be all-powerful in shaping behaviour. As such, behaviour, and the 
environmental variables of which it is a function, constituted the proper subject 
matter of scientific study for psychologists.  
However, after much research there was still dissatisfaction amongst many 
psychologists. This was especially in regard to the methods and theoretical 
justifications characteristic of mainstream psychology at the time. The main model in 
psychology was the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM) (Buss, 1995) which 
focused on culture and reason as the underlying causes of human behaviour. This 
model proposes that the mind is a blank slate (or tabula rasa) at birth, subsequently 
written on by experience, environment, and culture. Biological variables are 
minimised or ignored. It was clear, however, that all human behaviour could not be 
fully explained by nurture as maintained by the SSSM (Buss, 1995). This growing 
dissatisfaction led to a downgrading of behaviourism and a cognitive revolution in 
psychology.  Various theorists found that Behaviourism had not been  completely 
successful in banishing the mind from psychology (Thagard, 1992).  For instance, in 
1956 George Miller published the paper “The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus 
Two”, which provoked new ways of looking at the nature of information processing.  
Miller showed that the capacity for human thinking seemed to be limited, with short-
term memory limited to seven items plus or minus two.  A year after Miller‟s 
foundation article, Noam Chomsky‟s book, Syntactic Structures (1957) gave rise to 
linguistics and a psychology of language that was very different to that of the 
behaviourists.  Chomsky argued that the knowledge of language that is acquired so 
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quickly in children should be understood in terms of grammar, rather than as a 
collection of associations and habits (Thagard, 1992). At the same time Allan Newell 
and Herbert Simon announced that the development of the human brain was akin to 
the creation of a computer program that proved theorems in logic (Newell, Shaw, & 
Simon, 1957). This approach which was cognitive in that it likened the brain to a 
computer with neural networks, and cognitive processes being likened to various 
computer programs, which could account for all human cognition. This latter theory 
led to a focus on using cognitive processing models to study the human mind and 
behaviour. In this model, the brain awaits input in order to produce behavioural 
output; the computational ideas suggested how cognitive structures could produce 
behaviour (Thagard, 2002).   The concept of information as something that could be 
processed by a person or a computer, and the concept of information processing as 
applied to the human mind, was a major innovation (Thagard, 1992). As Plotkin 
(2004) remarks, 
 
The cognitive revolution…allowed psychologists to develop a rich theory 
of the causes of behaviour in terms of central processes and 
mechanisms. …now, at last, people could theorise about the existence 
of different forms of memory, attentional mechanisms, or integrating 
executive processes, for example, which could lead to predictions and 
be cashed out into experiments, the results of which were fed back as 
adjustments to the theory. …it was only with the cognitive revolution that 
psychology became a science again (p. 130).  
 
With psychology‟s integration with cognitive science, the conceptual heartland 
of behaviourism had weakened in force and with this the path opened for the new 
psychology of evolutionary psychology.  
The emergence of evolutionary psychology, which was founded on the 
principles of cognitive science and evolutionary biology, had as its main line of 
thought that a person‟s nature is the primary cause of behaviour, followed by the 
influences of nurture. Evolutionary psychology maintained that the strict nature vs. 
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nurture dichotomy was not of value in explaining behaviour as these are not two 
separate causal processes. Instead the thinking was that nurture builds on nature. 
Using Darwin‟s theory, evolutionary psychologists assert that a person‟s nature has 
been determined through millions of years of evolution by the processes of natural 
and sexual selection. These two processes have established the mind's cognitive 
architecture in order to achieve adaptive survival. In other words, if our physical 
selves are explainable in terms of evolutionary processes, and if our behaviours are 
mediated by our physical selves, then evolutionary thinking should be able to explain 
why we think and behave in the ways that we do. If our ways of thinking and 
behaving have lead to the continual reproduction of our species, then the 
psychological phenomena and their underlying mechanisms should be explainable 
in terms of evolutionary processes.  
However, the explanation of such psychological mechanisms continues to be 
elusive (Crawford, 1998) and the domain of psychology remains largely conceptually 
fragmented (Lykken, 1991; Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). Although evolutionary theory 
has recently been employed to explain various psychological phenomena (e.g., 
perception, consciousness, emotion, motivation, cognition, learning, personality, 
intelligence; see Gaulin & McBurney, 2004), mainstream psychology has largely 
resisted the use of evolutionary explanations to date (Buss, 1999; Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1998). The question of why evolutionary theory has failed to gain widespread 
acceptance in psychology has recently been addressed (e.g., Crawford, 1998). This 
question has prompted a renewed interest in evolutionary approaches within 
psychology, with the objective being to clarify the role and extent that evolutionary 
explanations can play in psychology. Some (e.g. Buss, 1995, 1999; Caporael, 2001; 
Sterelny, 1992) argue at one extreme that evolutionary theory is the only viable 
explanatory account for the diversity of biological phenomena, while at the other 
extreme, others (e.g. Fodor, 1998; Herrnstein-Smith, 2000; Rose, 2000) argue that 
evolutionary theory does not furnish convincing or useful explanations. A more 
recent line of argument is that evolutionary theory offers a unifying theoretical 
framework for psychology (Ketelaar & Ellis, 2000), and as such, it should play a 
more prominent role in explaining psychological phenomena. This line of argument 
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maintains that if we better understand the relationship between the central tenets of 
evolutionary theory and theories in psychology, then such an endeavour will be 
beneficial for our understanding of psychological phenomena. In this way, 
evolutionary psychologists seek to provide the conceptual tools needed to emerge 
from the current fragmented state of psychological theory. For more than a hundred 
years, the theory of evolution by natural selection has provided a useful heuristic 
framework which unites the many different facets of the biological sciences. 
Psychology has no such theory to unite its disparate parts. However evolutionary 
psychologists claim that their approach may eventually achieve this. More recently, 
this relationship between evolutionary explanations and psychology has begun to be 
clarified by a consideration of various philosophies of science (e.g., see Caporael, 
2001; Lakatos, 1970; Ketelaar & Ellis, 2000). 
This thesis investigates whether evolutionary psychology offers a new 
paradigm for integrating psychology with science. In this regard, I argue that 
evolutionary theory offers a coherent, unifying, explanatory framework for 
psychology, and that evolutionary thinking should have more of a prominent role in 
psychology than it currently does. I contend that evolutionary psychology has an 
appropriate scientific method for studying the mind and behaviour, and that it offers 
a new fruitful paradigm for integrating psychology with science. I reach this 
conclusion by a more through consideration of a contemporary theory in the 
philosophy of science.  
In order to support my position, I divide this thesis into seven chapters. In the 
first chapter I discuss the Standard Social Science Model as well as some of its 
common criticisms. This important model has been the intellectual basis for the 
social sciences throughout most of the 20th century. While the Standard Social 
Science Model appeals largely, or only, to environmental influences on an 
individual's behaviour, evolutionary psychology endorses the view that learned 
behaviour is the joint product of „innate‟ equipment interacting with environmental 
inputs. It is also important to understand some of the criticisms that evolutionary 
psychologists have made of this predominant model of social science research. To 
fully understand evolutionary psychology, it is necessary to understand evolutionary 
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theory, and so in the second chapter I give a brief account of evolutionary theory. I 
describe the main tenets of evolutionary theory; this chapter is sub-divided into two 
sections: natural selection and sexual selection. This discussion of evolutionary 
theory provides much of the theoretical basis for the later discussion on evolutionary 
psychology. Primed with knowledge of the fundamentals of evolutionary theory, 
chapter three turns to the question „What is evolutionary psychology?‟. In this 
chapter, I outline the aims of evolutionary psychology along with its five core theses. 
Together, these communicate the full extent of the discipline of evolutionary 
psychology and make clear its structure, framework, and ultimate goals. Chapter 
four is a case study of mate-selection, included in order to demonstrate evolutionary 
psychology‟s application. In the fifth chapter, I outline two very different theories in 
the philosophy of science; the first is that of Karl Popper (1959) and the second is 
that of Imre Lakatos (1970, 1978). Following this, I turn to the next question is 
whether of not evolutionary psychology can be fully integrated with the rest of 
science. The sixth chapter examines this question, and asks how this integration can 
be achieved. I demonstrate that evolutionary psychology can indeed be considered 
scientific by utilising a Lakatos‟ philosophy of science. Although the possibility of 
integration is strongly supported, there are also some significant criticisms against 
evolutionary psychology which need to be considered in future research in the field. 
The seventh chapter addresses these criticisms, which are: the reliance on domain-
specific modularity, the heavy weighting on the Environment of Evolutionary 
Adaptiveness, ignoring other possible causes of evolution, political conservatism, the 
reliance on “just so” stories, and reductionism.  
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1. THE STANDARD SOCIAL SCIENCE MODEL 
 
The Standard Social Science Model (SSSM) (e.g; Gaulin & McBurny, 2004) 
has been the intellectual basis for the social sciences throughout most of the 20th 
century. It was developed during a period when the natural sciences (including 
biology, physics, and chemistry) were becoming more and more integrated. In the 
early 20th century, the social sciences were outside of the unified scientific 
knowledge system. This meant that they were somewhat unsuccessful as sciences, 
and they provided limited scientific knowledge about humanity. This situation came 
about largely because the social sciences failed to recognise the value of connecting 
to the working methods of the larger body of scientific thought. As Cosmides, Tooby 
and Barkow (1992) remark,  
 
The social sciences have largely kept themselves isolated from this 
crystallizing process of scientific integration. Although social scientists 
imitated many of the outward forms and practices of natural scientists 
(quantitative measurement, controlled observation, mathematical models, 
experimentation, etc.), they have tended to neglect or even reject the 
central principle that valid scientific knowledge… should be mutually 
consistent (pp. 21-22). 
 
Nonetheless, the SSSM has a long history, reaching back before the 
incarnation of psychology to the early philosophers of the Enlightenment (Pinker, 
2002). This model stretches back to philosophers such as Aristotle, Locke, Hobbes 
and Berkeley (Cosmides & Tooby, 1998), and is based on an empiricist line of 
thinking which emphasises the major importance of environmental influences on 
behaviour (Buss, 1995).  
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1.1 The Standard Social Science Model 
 
The SSSM is founded on three interrelated assumptions. These are that the 
mind is a blank slate, that culture is more important than biology, and that general-
purpose learning mechanisms filter experience and account for variations in 
behaviour.  
 
1.1.1 The mind as a blank slate 
 
The first assumption is that the human mind is a blank slate, or tabula rasa, 
from birth. It is assumed that the mind has no initial content, and is „blank‟ until 
experience begins to shape it. On this view, the mind has no predetermined traits or 
tendencies, and is a neutral medium in which experiences make their mark. Locke 
(1690) stated that since ideas are grounded in experience, which varies from 
person-to-person, differences in opinion arise not because one mind is able to grasp 
the truth and another is defective, but rather because the two minds have different 
histories (Pinker, 2002). The behaviourists, for example, were of the view that there 
were no such things as an infant‟s talents or abilities (Pinker, 2002); talents and 
abilities would come later as a result of experience and cultural exposure. Gaulin 
and McBurny (2004) eloquently make this point: “just as you could scribble anything 
on the blackboard – a sonnet, your rendition of the Mona Lisa, the reaction pathway 
of a chemistry experiment – experience can supposedly carve any effect on human 
psychology” (p. 3). The assumption that the slate is initially blank means that there 
are no natural, inborn inclinations or tendencies. Those inclinations or tendencies 
that are seen in adults are assumed to be the result of their unique experiences. In 
other words, differences in people arise because of differences in their exposure to 
the environment, including culture which creates their subsequent experiences. 
Thus, human development is seen as a process whereby the mind is formed through 
its experience with the social world.  
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1.1.2 Culture versus biology 
 
Consistent with the first assumption, culture is held to more important than 
biology in developing the mind. As Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby (1994) emphasise, 
“the SSSM denies that „human nature‟ – the evolved architecture of the human mind 
– can play any notable role as a generator or significant organisation in human life 
(although it is acknowledged to be a necessary condition for it)” (p. 28). The 
assumption here is that culture plays a dominant role, with biological constraints on 
human behaviour seen as minor and unimportant (Gaulin & McBurny, 2004). 
According to the SSSM, humans have few, if any, instincts and only a few basic 
biological drives - such as hunger, thirst and sex. Instead, as Cosmides and Tooby 
(1998) note, the SSSM postulates that “all of the content of mind and behaviour is 
supplied by socialisation into one‟s culture, and so utilises a „learning-plus-culture 
conceptual framework‟” (p. 323). The behaviourist, John B. Watson (1925) also 
argued that instead of sharing a basis in biological humanity, people are greatly 
influenced by culture. 
Given that behaviourism (and other social sciences) denied that the minds of 
individual people were important (Pinker, 2002), behaviourism banished mental 
entities such as beliefs and desires, and replaced them with stimuli and responses. 
The social sciences located beliefs and desires in culture and societies rather than 
the head of the individual person (Pinker, 2002). However, as George Murdock 
(1935) famously remarked “cultural phenomena…are in no respect hereditary but 
are characteristically and without exception acquired‟ (Murdock, 1932, p. 200). 
According to Ashley Montagu (1973), with the exception of infantile reactions and 
withdrawals, the human being is instinctless.  Humans have no instincts because 
everything they are and have become, has been learned and acquired from their 
culture.  Although we have tendencies and capacities, our ideas, values, actions, 
and emotions are manufactured products.  
 
SSSM followers took this idea further, they believed that behaviour could be 
understood independently of biology, without considering the genetic makeup or 
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evolutionary history of the species (Pinker, 2002).  This view was that behaviour is 
the response to external stimuli and environmental factors, not chemical reactions 
within the brain. Harmful behaviour was neither instinctive nor freely chosen but 
rather, inadvertently conditioned.  
 
1.1.3 General-purpose learning 
 
The SSSM postulates that experience leads to learning. Adherents claim that 
there is either only one, or at most a very few, learning mechanisms. To account for 
all the different types of experiences, these learning mechanisms are characterised 
as general-purpose in nature. A general-purpose learning mechanism is “one that 
can handle many different kinds of input information and that can generate many 
different kinds of output” (Gaulin & McBurny, 2004, p.4). Thus adherents to the 
SSSM strive to discover how culture and experience, operating by means of one or 
more general-purpose learning mechanisms, produce variation in human behaviour. 
General-purpose learning mechanisms are also said to account for all variation 
human behaviour. It was on this basis that Watson (1925) famously stated:  
 
Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified 
world to bring them up in and I‟ll guarantee to take any one at random and 
train him to become any type of specialist I might select – doctor, lawyer, 
artist, merchant-chief, and yes, even beggar-man and thief, regardless of 
his talents, penchants, abilities, vocations and race of his ancestors (p. 
104.).  
 
Thus, general-purpose learning mechanisms are said to filter experience, and 
account for and generate variations in behaviour. In regard to the SSSM being 
embraced by psychology, Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby (1992) claim that “the role 
of psychology is clear. Psychology is the discipline that studies the process of 
socialisation and the set of mechanisms that comprise what anthropologists call „the 
capacity for culture‟” (p. 29). In other words, the task of psychology is to utilise the 
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SSSM to study the process of the unformed individual‟s development within their 
culture, and in this regard, the central concept within psychology is learning. 
 
1.2 Criticisms of the Standard Social Science Model from an evolutionary 
psychological perspective 
 
Below I discuss five interrelated issues: that the SSSM misunderstands the 
nature of human development, draws a false dichotomy between nature and nurture, 
cannot explain environmental effects by general laws of learning, drives a wedge 
between the natural and social sciences, and lacks an overarching theory of design. 
My discussion here draws on the extensive critiques of the SSSM by Tooby and 
Cosmides (1992) and by Gaulin and McBurney (2004). 
 
1.2.1 The Standard Social Science Model misunderstands the nature of human 
development 
 
The first criticism of the SSSM is that it misunderstands the nature of human 
development and is based on outdated theories of human development. Human 
development is seen as a process whereby the mind is a blank slate which forms 
through its introduction to, and experience with, the social world and subsequent 
experiences (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). The mind of the human infant is seen as a 
content-free mechanism which evolves when brought into contact with its 
environment. The very idea of a content-free mechanism is seen as inadequate 
when set alongside the vastly complex tasks the human mind must engage in from a 
young age, such as seeing, learning a language, and walking. 
However, a truly blank slate could not respond to the environment, as it would 
have no rules for determining how to respond (Buss, 1999). As Gaulin and McBurny 
(2004) point out, “a blank slate could never learn language; nor could it do much of 
anything else. Responses are impossible without rules for responding” (p.5). In 
contrast, human infants learn spoken language easily because their minds are 
prepared for the experience of language (Hayes, 1951). It is obvious there is a 
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human nature which is not a blank slate. The view of evolutionary psychologists is 
that the environment only has effects on organisms with certain inherent response 
tendencies. Tooby and Cosmides (1992) remark, “the claim that some phenomena 
are „socially constructed‟ only means that the social environment provided some of 
the inputs used by the psychological mechanisms of the individuals involved” (p. 89-
90). Thus, the social (and cultural) world plays only part of a causative role in the 
mental organisation of human development. Cultural differences are seen as real 
and important, however explanatory accounts of culture cannot ignore the underlying 
evolved psychological mechanisms. Evolved psychological mechanisms provide a 
necessary foundation for cultural analyses. Evolutionary psychology advocates 
integration and consistency of different levels of analysis, the cultural and the 
biological, not just the cultural (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). 
 
1.2.2 The Standard Social Science Model draws a false dichotomy between 
nature and nurture 
 
The second issue is the false dichotomy that the SSSM draws between nature 
and nurture (similarly, genes vs. environment, innate vs. learned, biology vs. 
culture). The SSSM asserts that behaviour is produced by the immersion of the 
individual into a culture, with nurture determining human development. The question 
here is whether a trait is shaped by various experiences in the environment, or 
whether it is shaped by something deeper; such as person‟s genes. The SSSM 
leans towards the former, however evolutionary psychologists see any attempt to 
compartmentalise the categories of „nature‟ and „nurture‟ as nonsensical, and regard 
it as mistaken to try and divide the causes of behaviour (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). 
Instead, evolutionary psychologists claim that nature and nurture work together in 
the development of traits; genes work with the environment. For example, mice, 
dogs, and birds have a different genetic makeup from human beings, and thus their 
adaptive behaviours to particular environmental stimuli are different to the 
behaviours a human would exhibit given the same environmental input. However, 
behaviour cannot be explained fully by the SSSM model‟s reliance on cultural input. 
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Instead evolutionary psychologists view the major causes of behaviour to be genetic. 
In this way, psychological mechanisms are a result of genetics working with the 
environment, and the two cannot be separated. Here, it can be seen that nature and 
nurture are working in tandem to produce behaviour.  In essence, the evolutionary 
psychologist argues that without basic psychological mechanisms, no environmental 
response is possible: “evolved mechanisms do not prevent, constrain or limit the 
system from doing things it otherwise would do in their absence. The system could 
not respond to „the environment‟ without the presence of mechanisms designed to 
create that connection” (Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992, p. 38). Richard Dawkins 
(1982) provided the analogy of making bread. Bread is the result of ingredients and 
heat; without both ingredients and heat, there would be no bread. However, once the 
ingredients and heat have interacted, it is then impossible to disentangle their effect, 
either logically or physically. Similarly, when considering the cause of a trait or 
behaviour, it is a mistake to attempt separate out nature and nurture.  
A similar claim to opposing nature and nurture is that nature sets the limits, but 
that experience shapes the traits within these boundaries. In other words, nurture 
builds on nature. For example, a fear of snakes can be observed in small children to 
exhibit an aversion based on threat. However, small children have not been taught 
that snakes are dangerous. Although supplemented by experience and learning that 
snakes are dangerous, the initial aversion is held to be a genetically coded 
response.  
However, it has been said that this approach fails to address the problem of 
how experiences can shape traits (Gaulin & McBurney, 2004). Instead of asking „is it 
nature or nurture?‟, evolutionary psychologists think it more appropriate to ask, „why 
does the environment have this particular effect?‟. Pinker (2002) has more recently 
expanded on the nature vs. nurture argument in light of new discoveries relating to 
brain plasticity, stating that “the brain somehow must change in response to its input; 
the only question is how” (p. 83). He goes on to explain that “it is not surprising that 
the discovery of plasticity has given the nature-nurture pendulum a push” (p.84),  
 
1.2.3. Environmental effects cannot be explained by general laws of learning 
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The third issue arises in the SSSM claim that environmental effects can be 
explained by general laws of learning. Starting from the assumption that there are no 
innate structures in the mind, the SSSM sees behaviour as the result of learned 
responses to the environment. However, evolutionary psychologists believe that 
learned behaviour is the joint product of „innate‟ equipment interacting with 
environmental inputs (Buss, 1995), and as such, no behaviour can be attributed 
solely to environmental effects. Instead, it is proposed that the brain has certain 
kinds of structures for learning. To learn, there must be some mechanism that 
causes this to occur, because learning cannot occur in the absence of a mechanism 
that causes it. Certain learning mechanisms must therefore be innate aspects of our 
evolved architecture that reliably developed across all the kinds of environmental 
variations that humans normally encountered during their evolutionary history. As 
Buss (2005) puts it, “to get your brain to learn, you would have to arrange the 
neurons in particular ways. You would have to create circuits that cause learning to 
occur. In short, you would have to equip your brain with programmes that cause it to 
learn. The same is true when natural selection is the engineer” (p. 31). Garcia (1981) 
has demonstrated that some things are extraordinarily difficult to learn, requiring 
thousands of trials while others can be learned in a single trial. More people learn 
fear of snakes, heights, spiders and darkness, for example, more easily than fear of 
cars or electrical outlets, which are currently more hazardous (Buss, 1995). That fear 
of snakes would have proposed a greater benefit to our ancestors, suggests that this 
fear is to some extent „programmed‟ into our minds as a psychological mechanism. 
Thus, it seems that humans are predisposed to learn some things more easily than 
others, based on their innate propensity or „programming‟.  
Secondary to this general debate is whether learning mechanisms are „general-
purpose‟ (things like trial and error induction; Herrnstein-Smith, 2000) or „domain-
specific‟ (things like mate preference mechanisms; Herrnstein-Smith, 2000). 
Evolutionary psychologists argue that there are no general-purpose learning 
mechanisms because those kinds of mechanisms would not serve any useful 
purpose (Gaulin & McBurney, 2004). As Don Symons (1992) has eloquently 
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elaborated, there is no such thing as a general solution because there is no such 
thing as a general problem. In contrast, learning mechanisms, which have 
themselves evolved, tend to be specialised for particular kinds of evolutionary 
problems. We should expect our brains to contain specialised modules that are 
finely tuned to the needs of the organism and that have evolved to solve each of the 
problems faced by our ancestors (Crawford, 1998). Evolutionary psychologists 
reason that each adaptive problem has its own solution, and that the human mind 
has evolved to be a highly complex system of mechanisms which enables the 
solution of a large variety of different adaptive problems. Because these evolved 
psychological mechanisms are likely to be large in number and complex in nature, 
one of the goals of evolutionary psychology is to specify and explain the rich 
diversity of learning mechanisms that organise the behaviour of humans. 
 
 
1.2.4. The Standard Social Science Model drives a wedge between the natural 
and social sciences  
 
The SSSM claims that psychology studies how experience and culture 
produces behavioural differences, and that there is therefore no room in psychology 
for the natural sciences, biology in particular. However, evolutionary psychologists 
argue that this overlooks the fact that biology makes our behaviour possible. 
Evolutionary psychologists claim that we think the way we do because of our 
evolved cognitive mechanisms. Their argument is that psychologists, in studying 
behaviour, are studying the behaviour of biological organisms which conform to the 
principles observed by biologists. Given that the most powerful principle in biology is 
the principle of evolution by natural selection (Sober, 1993), the correct conclusion is 
that a complete explanation of the behaviour of living organisms must involve 
evolution. This is succinctly put by Gaulin and McBurney (2004) who explain that 
trying to exempt the behaviour of organisms from the principles of biology is like 
“trying to exempt the behaviour of atoms from the principle of physics” (p. 13). Thus, 
the natural sciences, and biology in particular with its central principle of evolution, 
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seem highly relevant to understanding the behaviour of living organisms. 
Evolutionary psychologists argue that the natural and social sciences are linked and 
that all of science is a single coherent enterprise based on common assumptions 
and methods. As Gaulin and McBurney (2004) remark, “science is a single 
endeavour linked by a coherent set of laws, principles and theories” (p. 13) and 
“there is no scientifically defensible division between the natural and social sciences. 
Science is demonstrably one enterprise, not two, and living things are products of 
evolution” (p. 14). 
The SSSM claims that there is no room in the social sciences for the natural 
sciences has come about largely because of the failure of the social sciences to 
recognise the value of the working methods of the natural sciences. The social 
sciences have largely kept themselves isolated from the process of scientific 
integration (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). As Cosmides, Tooby, and Barkow (1992) 
remark, “although social scientists imitated many of the outward forms and practices 
of natural scientists (quantitative measurement, controlled observation, 
mathematical models, experimentation, etc), they have tended to neglect or even 
reject the central principle that valid scientific knowledge… should be mutually 
consistent” (pp. 21-22). Thus, the social sciences are not conceptually integrated. 
Conceptual integration (also known as „vertical integration‟) refers to the principle 
that the various disciplines within the behavioural and social sciences should make 
themselves mutually consistent, and consistent with what is known in the natural 
sciences as well (Cosmides, Tooby, & Barkow, 1992, p.4). 
 
1.2.5 The Standard Social Science Model lacks an overarching theory of design  
 
Traditional psychology is most concerned with mechanism, with how questions, 
while evolutionary psychology focuses on both mechanism and function, or why 
questions as well. Thus, evolutionary psychology provides an added perspective that 
enriches our current understanding of behaviour. As Gaulin and McBurney ( 2004) 
put it, “what is missing in the SSSM, and what evolutionary psychology adds to 
psychology, is an overarching theory that unifies these findings and allows one to 
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predict them in advance” (p. 14). Rather than explaining behaviour solely in terms of 
culture and experience, evolutionary psychologists seek to explain why people 
respond to their environments in the way they do. To do this, they explain why such 
features have been designed in our species over the course of evolution. Traditional 
psychology, or the SSSM, is most concerned with mechanism (with how questions), 
while evolutionary psychology focuses on both mechanism and function, (or why 
questions) as well. In other words, rather than explaining behaviour solely by culture 
and experience, evolutionary psychologists seek to explain more broadly why people 
respond to their environments in the way they do, and to do this they explain why 
such features have been designed in our species over the course of evolution. 
Thus, the SSSM is seen as an inadequate framework for the social sciences 
because it fails to take account of new developments in evolutionary biology, human 
development, and cognitive science. The broad conclusion is that neither „biology‟, 
„evolution‟, „society‟, nor „the environment‟ directly equate to behavioural outcomes 
“without an immensely long and intricate interleaving chain of causation involving 
interactions with an entire configuration of other causal elements” (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1992, p. 49). 
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2. EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
Since Darwin‟s book, On the Origin of Species (1859), there has been a huge 
literature on evolutionary theory. Most of this literature has focused on the principle 
of natural selection itself, and its explanatory application across a range of domains. 
However, Darwin‟s theory of evolution and its application to humans still meets with 
resistance and misunderstanding (Buss, 1995). 
The term „evolution‟ refers to a process of change over time. In regard to 
evolutionary theory, evolution concerns changes in traits of living organisms over 
many generations, including the emergence of new species with new traits. Darwin 
played a leading role in rekindling the idea of evolution and applying it to species. 
For Darwin, evolution meant a slow gradual change from one entity to another. For 
example, he explained in a series of logical steps how evolutionary processes work 
by using the illustration of how finch‟s evolved around the Galapagos Islands. He 
observed that each island had its own distinct type of finch, each with its own 
discrete characteristics. He argued that while all the Galapagos finches descended 
from a common South American ancestor, as they migrated from one island to 
another in the Galapagos Islands, they encountered varying conditions. Mainland 
finches were land-dwelling, seed-eating birds that had relatively large strong bills. 
However on many islands the large seed-eating bill was no longer as advantageous 
as it was on the mainland. Darwin found that on some islands finches had slender 
pointed bills for extracting insects, on other islands some had shorter and broader 
bills for tearing buds and leaves, and on other islands again some used cactus 
spines in very long straight bills for getting insects out of trees. Darwin‟s conclusion 
was that over generations the finches on each island had adapted to the specific 
environmental conditions present. The finches that possessed traits that were most 
functional for exploiting resources on their particular island survived and passed on 
their traits to their offspring until each island had its own distinctly different type of 
finch. In other words, according to Darwin, the finches‟ genotypes were shaped by 
their environment and gradually evolved over time. Darwin‟s theory rests upon the 
phenomena of natural and sexual selection. I will briefly discuss these principles. 
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2.1 Natural selection 
 
Darwin‟s significant contribution to our understanding of evolution was his 
account of the mechanism of natural selection as the causal mechanism for 
explaining evolutionary change. This mechanism enabled Darwin to explain why 
organisms appeared so well adapted to their local environments. The theory hinged 
around the idea that all organisms‟ physical and behavioural traits are the result of a 
slow adaptive process. In The Origin of Species (1859), Darwin laid out the evidence 
for evolution by natural selection as a rigorous scientific theory. 
There are three main components of natural selection: variation, heritability, 
and selection. Variation refers to a state in which there exists a variety of biological 
traits within a population. For example, organisms vary in their wing length, bone 
mass, trunk structure, cell structure, fighting ability, and social cunning. Principal 
sources of this variation are mutation and recombination. Mutation refers to 
alterations to individual genes while recombination refers to the endless variety of 
particular gene combinations produced by sexual reproduction. Some of the ways 
individual organisms vary confer advantage, others confer disadvantage, and some 
have little, if any, effect at all. Advantageous and disadvantageous effects are 
defined by how they influence an individual‟s ability to survive and reproduce in their 
particular environments. Thus there are two ways in which organisms vary: they 
have traits that aid or hinder their survival, and they have traits that aid or hinder 
their ability to reproduce. For example, greater speed gives a cheetah greater 
success in pursuing prey in the African plains and a kea‟s greater social cunning 
helps it to compete with other birds for limited resources. A large and bright display 
of peacock feathers helps attract mates, whereas a small body mass hinders 
reproduction in a gorilla, because small gorillas are lower in the pecking order and 
have less access to females. The environmental context determines whether a 
particular trait is advantageous or not for reproductive survival. An organism with an 
especially short lifespan can dramatise the process of natural selection (Ridley 
2002). For example, the HIV virus, an organism which exhibits both inheritance and 
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variation, as well as a high degree of mutations within the overall population, takes 
two days to reproduce.  
Heritability is closely linked with variation and refers to the ability of variations to 
be inherited through reproduction. Variation in this sense refers to the differences 
within a local population of the same species at any one time. The types of variants 
may mean that an individual is more or less suited to challenges within its 
environment. However natural selection only occurs when these variations are also 
linked to something which influences potential reproductive success, in something 
which biologists term “fitness”. The successful combination of attributes will likely be 
passed down at a genetic level, as individuals with this combination will produce 
more offspring. Individuals are more likely to resemble their genetic parents (i.e., 
vary less) than others in the same population. For example, with a strong family 
resemblance, a son may have his father‟s nose or a daughter may have her 
mother‟s eyes or cheekbones. These traits have been pasted down from generation 
to generation through the genetic material (i.e., DNA) that is transmitted from the 
parents. Heritable traits vary in regards to the fitness they confer; variations may 
predispose an individual to be more or less likely to survive and reproduce than 
those who do not possess those traits. 
Natural selection is the process whereby variations that individuals possess 
make them more or less well adapted to their environment and therefore more or 
less likely to survive and pass on those variations. The process of natural selection, 
which created the delicate specializations of human physical structure, has been a 
very long, drawn out series of “accidental” appearances of certain genetic traits, 
which were advantageous for survival, and passed on through reproduction. As 
Write (1994) comments: 
 
The thing that is massively more probable than the charmed lineages that 
populate the world today – an uncharmed lineage, which reaches a dead 
end through an unlucky break – happened a massively larger number of 
times. The dustbin of genetic history overflows with failed experiments…. 
Their disposal is the price paid for design by trial and error. But so long as 
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that price can be paid – so long as natural selection has enough 
generations to work on, and can cast aside scores of failed experiments 
for every one it preserves – its creations can be awesome. Natural 
selection  is an inanimate process, devoid of consciousness, yet it is a 
tireless refiner, and ingeneous craftsman. (pp. 25-6).  
 
The thing that is massively more probable than the charmed lineages that populate the 
world today – an uncharmed lineage, which reaches a dead end through an unlucky break – 
happened a massively larger number of times. The dustbin of genetic history overflows with 
failed experiments…. Their disposal is the price paid for design by trial and error. But so 
long as that price can be paid – so long as natural selection has enough generations to work 
on, and can cast aside scores of failed experiments for every one it preserves – its creations 
can be awesome. Natural selection  is an inanimate process, devoid of consciousness, yet it 
is a tireless refiner, and ingeneous craftsman. (pp. 25-6).   
 
Thus, advantageous heritable traits are more likely to remain in, and spread 
through, a population because those traits help the organism to survive and 
reproduce. As Wright (1994) further remarks:  
 
If within a species there is variation among individuals in their hereditary 
traits, and some traits are more conductive to survival and reproduction 
than others, then those traits will (obviously) become more widespread 
within the population. The result (obviously) is that the species‟ arrogate 
pool of hereditary traits changes (p. 23).  
 
2.2 Sexual selection 
 
Sexual selection is a form of selection, which works together with natural 
selection. Sexual selection can be defined as the selection for traits that increase the 
ability to attract and mate with members of the opposite sex. Sexual selection can be 
seen to have an effect on genes in a species in which mating success has evolved 
to depend on the ability of one sex to attract the other with a display of dance and 
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colour, such as some Birds of Paradise, or song, such as some species of frogs or 
the „booming‟ of the New Zealand Kakapo. This form of selection also operates in 
species in which competition between the members of the same species eventually 
results in winning the right to choose a mate or mates.  
It is advantageous to distinguish between factors that drive natural and sexual 
selection since this explains why, in some species, males have evolved highly 
specialized and often ornate traits which, while beneficial to mating, seem to hinder 
an organism‟s survival. For example, peacocks have flamboyantly coloured tails 
which can be detrimental to survival because they are costly to produce, attract 
predators, and impair their ability to escape. However, their bright tails are also 
attractive to female mates, a factor which increase their reproductive success (Buss, 
2005). Sexual selection over many generations drives such adaptations in the 
following ways. Inter-sexual selection refers to traits that one sex prefers in the 
opposite sex, and it is usually a result of females selecting for males of high genetic 
quality. This is the mechanism behind the Peacock‟s tail, the Kakapo‟s boom, and 
the frog‟s call. It is also why being tall or having blond hair is valued in some human 
cultures, because having these preferential characteristics increases a person‟s 
chance of being selected for reproduction by the opposite sex.  
Intra-sexual selection, on the other hand, refers to competition among members 
of the same sex for mating access to the opposite sex. The existence of genetic size 
differences between sexes in a species could be seen as a fairly reliable indicator of 
this mechanism at work. In the elephant seal population, for example, males are 
much larger than females, and there is a distinct social hierarchy in the male 
population which is directly linked to the ability to breed (Zuk, 2002). Likewise, male 
gorillas compete by slapping water or banging their chests in order to demonstrate 
their dominance to other males, and thus gain preferential access to females (Zuk, 
2002). Those species in which polygamy, rather than monogamous mating habits, 
are the norm, are more likely to display intra-sexual selection. This occurs because 
as there is direct competition among males for the right to mate, which sets 
conditions for advantageous traits to develop by sexual selection. 
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The traits in question are the manifest solutions to adaptive problems, and 
show the results of the mechanisms whereby sex-specific characteristics can evolve 
in a species under sexual selection (Buss, 2005). Both inter-sexual and intra-sexual 
selection amalgamate with reproductive success, which is defined as the ability of an 
individual to increase the representation of its genes in the population (Cartwright, 
2000). 
Darwin (1859) himself summarized natural selection concisely as “multiply, 
vary, let the strongest live and the weakest die” (p. 263). Thus, the bottom line of 
evolution by natural selection is survival and reproductive success relative to others. 
This mechanism of natural selection explains both how and why evolutionary 
changes happen over time; it explains why organisms have characteristics that 
serve them well in the context of their environments. The conclusion is that 
individuals best suited to their environment within a population will pass on more 
traits than those who are less suited, and the population's heritable makeup will 
adaptively change over time. Advantageous traits will become more common, while 
disadvantageous traits will become less common. Natural and sexual selection thus 
provide a causal account of the relationship between adaptive environmental 
challenges and the "design" features of various species, including humans. 
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3. WHAT IS EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY?  
 
Evolutionary psychology has derived largely out of dissatisfaction with the 
Standard Social Science Model and various challenges to more current 
psychological paradigms, in particular to that of behaviourism (Buss, 1995). Also 
important has been the impetus provided by Sociobiology (Wilson, 1975), a very 
similar discipline which has grown up within biological science. Evolutionary theory is 
important in understanding human behavior as it provides psychology with a means 
of explaining the nature and organization of the mind, just as it has provided 
explanations for other physical phenomena (e.g., Darwin‟s finches). Evolutionary 
psychologists view psychology as a branch of biology, and as such, it studies brains, 
their evolution, how brains process information, and how the brain‟s information-
processing programmes generate behaviour (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987). Thus, the 
scientific tools and methods developed in biology are used in psychology to 
understand the human mind and behaviour.  
The foundations of evolutionary psychology reach back to Darwin. Although 
Darwin barely alluded to the implications of natural selection for human psychology, 
in the final chapter of the Origins of Species (1859), he speculated that psychology 
“will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each 
mental power and capacity by graduation. Light will be thrown on the origin of man 
and his history” (p. 458). By this Darwin meant that psychology will come to embrace 
the tenets of evolutionary theory and apply them to the bigger picture of human 
evolution. He further provided the logical foundations for the future development of 
evolutionary explanations of psychological phenomena in The Decent of Man 
(1871).  
However, the tenets of evolutionary theory are not being upheld by many, and 
evolution psychology is often overlooked and rejected. The convenient use of the 
causal relationship between evolution and behavior is often made, while at the same 
time neglecting a crucial link – that of a psychological mechanism (Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1987). This is crucial because the casual link between evolution and 
behaviour is only made possible by a mediating factor, a psychological mechanism. 
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Cosmides and Tooby (1987) describe a psychological mechanism as the human‟s 
innate processing system which connects the evolutionary process to particular 
manifested behaviors. It is these psychological mechanisms that generate 
behaviours and have evolved over generations through interactions with the 
environment. 
Past attempts at applying evolutionary theory directly at the level of 
behaviour, rather than using it as an heuristic guide for discovery of innate 
psychological mechanisms, has lead to limited effectiveness in adopting evolutionary 
theory (Buss, 1995). These attempts to find evolutionary invariants at the level of 
behaviour have created a series of difficulties, one of which includes the optimality of 
behavior. Contrary to the normal stream of scientific research, natural selection 
theory does not predict invariance in the behavior of different individuals. Rather it 
predicts that the behavior of different individuals will vary enormously (Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1998) and, in some, appear far from optimal.  
Due to conflicts between the interests of individuals, each selected to promote 
its own inclusive fitness, an outcome cannot, in principle, produce results that will be 
optimal for both individuals. Hamilton (1964) proposed that the original definition of 
fitness did not encompass all possible ways of successfully passing on one‟s genes, 
and instead proposed that the term „inclusive fitness‟ was a more fitting description. 
According to Hamilton, inclusive fitness is not a property of an individual or an 
organism, but rather a property of its actions or effects. It can be viewed as the sum 
of an individual‟s reproductive success plus the effects the individual‟s actions have 
on the reproductive success of his or her genetic relatives (Buss, 1999). For 
example, it is possible for a person to pass on their genes by helping brothers and 
sisters, nieces and nephews to survive and reproduce. Thus, the behaviors of 
individuals cannot be understood in isolation. Individuals adapt to their situation by 
using their best strategies; these may incorporate many factors such as size, health, 
aggression and the ability to accrue resources. Individuals with the same 
psychological programming may manifest different behaviors in response to different 
information they derive from the environment. However, for a behavioral mechanism 
to be selected, it need not be of advantage under every conceivable circumstance. It 
26 
 
 
 
 
need only be of benefit on balance, and thus, must be advantageous more often 
than not. In other words, natural selection cannot be expected to produce behavioral 
responses that maximize fitness under every imaginable circumstance. It depends 
largely on how adapted the individual is to their particular situation. This is the result 
of species adapting to specific or similar situations in evolutionary history.  
Without a focus on the psychological mechanism in natural selection, the 
application of evolutionary theory to human behavior was impoverished. As 
Cosmides and Tooby (1987) remark, “natural selection cannot select for behavior 
per se; it can only select for mechanisms that produce behavior” (p. 280). To 
illustrate this point, they use the analogy of the digestive system. Natural selection‟s 
role here has been to rearrange tissues and molecules to form our digestive system. 
This rearrangement has had particular effects, and it is the presence of these effects 
that has determined whether each adaptation has been selected for use or not. In 
other words, natural selection has provided us with the food processing machinery 
(i.e., enzymes), however the operation of the food processing machinery which 
results in digestion is the effect of the functioning of mechanism per se. Analogously, 
behaviour is the effect of the functioning of psychological mechanisms. This effect 
cannot occur in the absence of a mechanism for producing it. However, researchers 
have been unwilling to explore psychological mechanisms, as exploration of the 
neurophysiologic aspects of behavior is a difficult area and one in which only a 
limited amount of research resources are available. Instead, Cosmides and Tooby 
(1987) have suggested that an alternative to the neurophysiological approach is the 
characterization of psychological mechanisms in terms of their ability to processing 
information. Behavior is elicited by both information we gain from the environment, 
and by how we process that information. Natural selection has provided this 
information processing machinery to produce behavior, just as it provided food 
processing machinery to produce digestion. Behavioural outputs differ from 
informational inputs, as the information processing machinery that maps 
informational input onto behavioral output involves a particular psychological 
mechanism.  
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Evolutionary theory can be consistently applied to tackle many of the 
problems that have appeared and which obstruct progress, in the social sciences. 
Behavioral sciences in particular have faced setbacks because they have based 
their investigation on finding systematic patterns which do not exist. As humans are 
the product of evolutionary processes, their characteristics are embedded in the 
evolutionary process. This is why evolutionary psychologists aim to study 
psychological mechanisms. This emphasis on psychological mechanism provides 
the fundamental difference between the approaches of sociobiology and 
evolutionary psychology. 
 
3.1 The aims of evolutionary psychology 
 
As evolutionary psychology utilizes the basic theoretical principles of 
evolutionary theory, it takes the view that the inherited architecture of the mind is the 
product of evolutionary process. In this regard, the principal focus of evolutionary 
psychology is to understand the cognitive mechanisms of the mind through 
understanding how such mechanisms evolved via the processes of natural and 
sexual selection. By appealing to cognitive mechanisms, as opposed to interpreting 
the outward signs of human behaviour as has been the traditional focus in 
psychology (e.g., behaviourism), the focus and aims are on explaining mental 
mechanisms rather than on behaviour.  
In searching for what causes behaviour in an organism, evolutionary 
psychologists employ the notions of proximate and distal (or ultimate) explanations. 
A proximate analysis of behaviour is an attempt to explain how an organism comes 
to exhibit a pattern of behaviour, whereas a distal analysis is characterised as an 
attempt to explain why these behaviours occur from an evolutionary perspective 
(Mayr, 1961, 1982). In other words, proximal explanations explain how psychological 
mechanisms operate, and refer to the individuals‟ physiology, development and 
environmental stimuli in explaining the cause of behaviour. In contrast, distal (or 
ultimate) explanations explain why psychological mechanisms evolved, positing that 
these occurred through natural and sexual selection. These explanations refer to the 
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function of the psychological mechanisms per se, and their role in solving particular 
adaptive problems. For example, proximate explanations include things such as a 
person‟s psychological mechanisms, their developmental history, learning, and 
environmental stimuli. Distal explanations, on the other hand, include things such as 
the ancestral environment, sexual, and natural selection (Siegert & Ward, 2002). A 
proximal analysis will look at an individual organism and its immediate environment 
without recourse to evolutionary theory, while a distal analysis will proceed on the 
assumption that the organism‟s behaviour results from selection in the populations 
from which the organism descended (i.e., the species history). 
With evolutionary psychology‟s focus on the mechanisms underlying behaviour, 
instead of the behaviour itself, it has been interested in distal as well as proximate 
explanations. This aim is an important strength of evolutionary psychology in that it 
explains behaviour in terms of both proximate and distal causes (Siegert & Ward, 
2002), whereas traditional psychology focuses on proximate causes (i.e., culture and 
experience as the cause of behaviour). However, as Durrant and Ellis (2003) point 
out, distal and proximate explanations are not independent, as they inform and 
influence each other. In this sense, “discerning the evolved function of a 
psychological mechanism, for example, should aid in discovering how the 
mechanism works – that is, understanding how evolved function can generate 
hypotheses about proximate mechanisms and causation” (Durrant & Ellis, 2003, p. 
24). Thus, evolutionary psychology provides a more comprehensive explanation, as 
in addition to a proximal explanation, it also provides an ultimate explanation which 
offers an additional perspective for understanding human behaviour.  
However, evolutionary psychology also has a broader aim. In addition to the 
scientific mapping of our evolved psychological mechanisms, evolutionary 
psychology also “includes the project of reformulating and expanding the social 
sciences in light of the progressive mapping of our species‟ evolved architecture” 
(Tooby & Cosmides, 2005, p.6). In this regard, the aim is to narrow the 
discrepancies between the behavioural and social sciences and to repair the 
situation where “evolutionary biology, psychology, psychiatry, anthropology, 
sociology, history, and economics largely live in inglorious isolation from one 
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another. … (as) theories in the behavioural and social sciences are rarely evaluated 
on the grounds of conceptual integration and multidisciplinary, multilevel 
compatibility” (Cosmides, Tooby & Barkow, 1992, p.4) 
 
3.2 Combining evolutionary biology and cognitive psychology 
 
Evolutionary psychology has developed out of a fusion of the two disciplines of 
evolutionary biology and cognitive psychology. As such, some of the origins of 
evolutionary psychology are embedded in the sciences of evolutionary biology and 
cognitive psychology.  
Evolutionary biology is the application of the theory of evolution by natural 
selection in order to explain the ways in which living things have evolved over time 
through adaptation to their environments (i.e., the process of natural selection 
explains biological evolution). For instance, evolutionary biologists maintain that 
humans are descended from apes and ultimately share a single common ancestor 
with all other living things. Evolutionary biology came about when the theories of 
natural selection, genetic drift and mutation were articulated by mathematicians in 
the early 20th century and brought about a unification of biology and evolutionary 
studies (Cosmides, Tooby & Barkow, 1992). Evolutionary biologists studied the 
physical structures of humans just as they studied the physical properties of animals 
and plants, assuming that such structures arise through the pressures of selection. 
However, the focus for biologists was not the human mind; they studied the physical 
aspects of humanity, with the discovery of the gene giving more support to the 
findings of evolutionary theory. Evolutionary psychologists on the other hand, were 
trying to unlock the links between physical and mental structures.  
A second origin of evolutionary psychology was the science of cognitive 
psychology. Cognitive psychology explains thought and emotion in terms of 
information and computation (Buss, 1995; 1999). Cognitive psychology‟s main 
premise is that behaviour is caused by mental states (such as beliefs and desires) 
and that the mind is like a computer; it is seen as a series of modular information-
processing mechanisms (Dennett, 1996). Cognitive psychology built on the advent 
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of the computer and the application to the human mind of the language of 
information-processing (Dennett, 1996). As Tooby and Cosmides (2005) note, “a 
cognitive description specifies what kinds of information the mechanism takes as 
input, what procedures it uses to transform that information, what kinds of data 
structures (representations) those procedures operate on, and what kinds of 
representations or behaviours it generates as output” (p. 29). In other words, the 
metaphor of computation made the language of describing the mind as a series of 
programmes that process information possible, and thus cognitive psychology sees 
human mental processes as a series of information processing mechanisms. The 
“brain‟s evolved function is computational – to use information to adaptively regulate 
the body and behaviour – so computational and informational formalisms are by their 
nature the most appropriate to capture the functional design of behaviour regulation” 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1998, p. 14). Thus, psychology looked at the mind as a series 
of mechanisms or programmes, and psychologists sort behaviour to understand the 
information processing machinery in our brains in order to understand the casual 
underpinnings of human performance. 
 
3.3 Evolutionary psychology is not human sociobiology 
 
Evolutionary psychology is not the same as the discipline of sociobiology. 
Edward Wilson (1975) attempted to organise thinking about evolutionary biology by 
integrating cellular biology, investigative neurophysiology, ethnology, comparative 
psychology, population biology and behavioural ecology. Wilson was suggesting that 
the same principles of behaviour could be applied to all species, both humans and 
animals, and he utilised and synthesised theories developed in other sciences and 
the social sciences (e.g., inclusive fitness theory, theories of parental investment and 
sexual selection) in order to explain human nature. In this sense, both sociobiology 
and evolutionary psychology have a core focus on evolutionary theory. However, 
evolutionary psychologists differ from sociobiologists by suggesting that the 
emphasis of fitness maximisation in sociobiology is not an adequate explanation for 
behaviour (Buss, 1999). Evolutionary Psychology has a different perspective on the 
31 
 
 
 
 
role of evolved psychological mechanisms and the ways in which they operate. 
Instead of explaining behaviour in terms of fitness maximisation, evolutionary 
psychologists suggest that we need to account for ways in which the ends 
(behaviour) sometimes do not follow simply from the means (psychological 
mechanisms). In essence, humans are adaptation executors, not fitness pursuers. 
Evolutionary psychologists hope that mapping the computational architecture of the 
mechanisms will give a better theory of behaviour, while relying on predictions 
derived for fitness maximisation will give a very impoverished and unreliable set of 
predictions about behavioural dynamics (Cosmides & Tooby, 1998). 
 
3.4 The core theses of evolutionary psychology 
 
Utilising the principles evolutionary theory, as well as evolutionary biology and 
cognitive psychology, and directed by the aims described above, evolutionary 
psychology is comprised of five main interconnecting components: 
computationalism, adaptationism, modularity, a unique methodology, and what is 
referred to as the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA). These five 
commitments support evolutionary psychology‟s central assumption that the human 
brain is comprised of a large number of specialized mechanisms that have been 
shaped by natural selection over vast periods of time to solve recurrent information-
processing problems faced by our ancestors (Symons, 1995). It is from these core 
components that evolutionary psychology builds a theory of the human mind and 
behaviour.  
 
3.4.1 Computationalism 
 
Evolutionary psychologists utilise the language of cognitive psychologists in 
their efforts to understand the mind as a computational mechanism. In this regard, 
cognitive psychologists use the term „mind‟ to refer to an information-processing 
account of the way the brain works. Evolutionary psychologists came to realise that 
they needed to comprehend the information-processing ability of the human brain in 
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order to understand the causal underpinning of human performance. With this 
approach, it has become common for psychologists to describe the brain as “a 
system that processes information – a computer made out of organic compounds 
rather than silicon chips” (Barkow, Cosmides & Tooby, 1992, p. 8). A computer 
processes information by taking in information (input), processing that information, 
and providing an output. It is argued that this is an appropriate model for the human 
mind which takes input from the environment (sensory information), processes it 
(makes complex transformations of the information), and then generates an output 
(thought, behaviour). Thus, evolutionary psychologists posit that the human mind 
consists of a set of evolved information-processing mechanisms embedded in the 
human nervous system.  
Based on the work of David Marr (1982), Cosmides and Tooby (2001) argued 
that cognitive psychology should be anchored in computational theories. In their 
words,  
 
A computational theory specifies what the problem is and why there is a 
device to solve it. In short, it specifies the function of an information 
processing device. As information processing devices are designed to solve 
problems, they solve problems by virtue of their structure and hence to 
explain the structure of a device, you need to know what problem it was 
designed to solve and why it was designed to solve the problem. This in 
other words means that Computational Theory is a theory specifying what 
functional characteristics a mechanism capable of solving that problem 
must have (p. 162).  
 
Computational theory considers specific information processing problems, 
including the constraints of natural selection theory. These problems should be 
made explicit as they form the building blocks of psychological theories (Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1987). However, by itself computational theory is not enough to establish 
accurately how a mechanism solves a specific adaptive problem, because a 
particular problem may have many different solutions. For example, warm blooded 
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animals must solve the problem of thermal regulation in order to survive. Dogs do 
this by evaporation from their protruding tongues, whereas humans achieve it with 
sweat glands distributed throughout the body. Computational theory itself does not 
provide a shortcut to conducting scientific experiments to test hypothesis about how 
organisms solve problems. It does, however, describe successful solutions to 
adaptive problems. Computational theories are able to exclude from consideration 
the thousands of possibilities that fail to solve an adaptive problem. For example, 
one such constraint in humans is that the relevant information for solving an 
adaptive problem must have been a recurrent feature of a human ancestral 
environment (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987). Natural selection rigidly constrains the 
patterns of behaviour that can evolve in such domains, and thus provides insights 
into the structure of the cognitive programmes that produce these patterns of 
behaviour. 
Discovering the structure of complex cognitive programs requires a great deal 
of theoretical guidelines. Marr (1982) suggests, therefore, that the computational 
theories of each information processing problem must be developed before progress 
can be made in experimentally investigating the cognitive programmes that solve 
them. Computational theory specifies the nature of an informational processing 
problem by incorporating constraints on the way the world is structured. These 
constraints provide sufficient information to allow processing to succeed. The 
production of behaviour that respects constraints imposed by the evolutionary 
process is a cognitive programme‟s adaptive function; and, it is the reason why it 
was selected, the reason it could supersede other cognitive programmes and spread 
through the population to become a species typical trait. It is important to note that 
the specificity of constraint imposed by the evolutionary process does not in itself 
constitute a complete computational theory. These constraints merely define what 
counts as adaptive behaviour. Cognitive programmes are the means by which 
behaviour, adaptive or otherwise, is produced, whereas computational theory 
addresses the question of what kind of cognitive programmes an organism must 
have if it is to behave adaptively. Although natural selection theorists often do not 
think of their theories as defining information processing problems, this is precisely 
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what they do. For example, to benefit kin in accordance with the constraints of kin 
selection theory, an organism must have cognitive programmes that allow it to 
extract certain specific information from its environment. Knowing that an organism 
has some means of distinguishing kin from non kin may not enable us to identify the 
specific structure of the cognitive program, but it does help to narrow down the 
hypotheses. The cognitive program responsible must be sensitive to environmental 
cues that correlate with kin. Frequently, only a few sufficient cues from the 
environment will be available. Researchers can, therefore, easily pinpoint which 
cues are used by the organism. Discovering which cues will later illuminate other 
procedures in information processing. For example, early exposure suggests an 
imprinting process, whereas facial similarity suggests a phenotype matching 
procedure. Slowly but surely, the cognitive programme responsible for kin selection 
can be mapped. However, if the research is blind to function, there will be no means 
by which the program can be understood. The organism‟s behaviour will be random 
with respect to the constraints unless it has some means of extracting relevant 
information from the environment. 
A clearly specified computational theory is also needed as it provides a test of 
adequacy that any proposed psychological theory must be able to pass. In this 
instance, the computational theory allows one to test the cognitive program to 
discover whether it is strong enough to produce adaptive solutions. According to 
Cosmides and Tooby (1987), any proposed cognitive system must be powerful 
enough to produce adaptive behaviour while not simultaneously producing 
maladaptive behaviours. Therefore, our cognitive programmes must be constructed 
in such a way that they somehow lead to the adaptive results, specified by 
evolutionary theory on the basis of the information available. This test of accuracy 
allows researchers to eliminate many hypotheses such as the general purpose 
learning theories that were popular in psychology‟s past. This is how natural 
selection theory can be used to develop computational theories of adaptive 
information processing problems. 
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3.4.2 Adaptationism 
 
It was suggested above that computational theories of information processing 
problems must be developed before progress can be made in experimentally 
investigating the cognitive programs that solve them. However, cognitive programs 
still have to be selected by the process of adaptation, as the function of these 
programs is to assist the organism to adapt to the environment, that is, to solve 
adaptive problems.  
Adaptationism is the process by which natural selection produces various 
designs, called „adaptations‟, which aid in reproduction. Grace (2001) defines 
adaptations as “inherited characteristics that arise in a species through natural 
selection because they facilitate reproduction. They are genetically inherited and 
have the primary function of solving adaptive problems. The hallmarks of 
adaptations are qualities like complexity, economy and precision, that point to 
evidence of special design” (p. 3). Thus, an adaptation is an inherited, and reliably 
developed characteristic that came into existence through natural selection because 
it enhanced survival or reproductive fitness during the period of its evolution. 
The function of an adaptation is to increase reproductive fitness. For 
reproductive function to be effective, an organism will have to solve many problems 
posed in the environment, for example, food choice, mate preference, and avoiding 
predators. Such information from the environment has to be processed through 
computational theory mechanisms, and guided by adaptation before the genes 
incorporate input from the environment into a neural design. In short, adaptation 
shapes the psychological mechanism of an organism. 
Evolutionary psychologists (Samuels, 2000; Symons, 1995) have suggested 
that human psychological mechanisms may be likened to Darwin‟s finches‟ adapted 
beaks. Humans face different kinds of environmental problems for survival, which in 
turn has caused humans to develop specific psychological mechanisms, which are 
termed adaptations. In order to fully understand the function of adaptation, it is 
important to understand that selection is not a random process, and that adaptations 
are formed slowly and are costly. 
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Firstly, selection is not a random process. Adaptation according to Crawford 
(1998) is goal directed, and Williams (1966), in support of this idea, states that an 
adaptation is the effect of response to selection. Four natural processes are known 
to cause evolution or changes in gene occurrence in a population. However 
selection is the only one that can create an adaptation and the only one that is not a 
random process. The other three, mutation, drift and gene flow, are all random, and 
Buss (1999) describes these as lacking “the necessary creativity because their 
action is random relative to individuals‟ environmental problems” (p. 278). As 
Thornhill (1998) mentions, “an adaptation is a phenotypic feature that is so precisely 
organized for some apparent purpose that chance cannot be the explanation for the 
feature‟s existence” (p. 547). In a sense, each adaptation is the archive of data of 
the selection that made it. These data are in the functional design of the adaptation. 
To discover the purposeful design of an adaptation, then, is to discover the kind of 
selection that led to the adaptation. Saying that the selection of adaptation is not 
random means that adaptative problems select for adaptation. In other words, 
adaptive problems act as the selection agent of adaptation. Over evolutionary time, 
more and more design features accumulate to form an integrated structure or device 
that is well engineered to solve its particular adaptive problem.  
Secondly, adaptations are formed slowly and are costly. The natural pace of 
evolution is measured in generations, and traits cannot spread any faster than an 
organism in the population can reproduce. Thus, the pace of evolution is governed 
by the pace of reproduction. For humans, the generation time from birth to 
reproduction is roughly 25 years (Buss, 1999). Compared to the generation time of 
bacteria, which can be as little as 20 minutes, humans evolve much slower than 
other organisms. The time it takes for reproductively successful mutations to arise 
and spread in the population, is often taken to be roughly 1000-10,000 generations; 
for humans, that equals about 20,000-200,000 years (Hagen, 2005). Adaptations 
also form slowly as natural selection can only choose naturally occurring 
alternatives; it cannot create entirely new variants. To select means to choose from 
existing possibilities. Adaptations are costly in that they have a variety of costs which 
are associated with assembling the trait during development and with its 
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maintenance. The materials and energy used for the adaptation could have been put 
to some other use, however, traits give a reproductive benefit sufficient to justify its 
cost.  
Thus, natural selection is constantly changing organisms as it shapes them for 
reproduction, and those that reproduce pass on their traits to the next generation. 
For instance, bat sonar, the human eye, and the cheetah‟s agility were all a product 
of natural selection because they solved an immediate environmental challenge, 
such as obtaining food, avoiding predation, or avoiding danger (Gaulin & McBurney, 
2004). These designs, and naturally occurring variations among individuals, are 
consistently being tested against the environment. Thus individuals have 
adaptations because they enhance the fit between the individual and their 
environment, and such a fit increases their chances of reproduction. Cosmides, 
Tooby and Barkow (1992) explain this point:  
 
The more sensitive retina allows one to see predators faster, the new 
digestive enzyme allows one to extract more nutrients from one‟s food, 
the new learning mechanism allows one to find food more efficiently. 
Individuals who exhibit such design modifications will be likely to have 
more offspring, and their offspring will inherit these traits and pass them 
on by reproduction. Eventually, the entire species will exhibit this feature 
as part of its genetic makeup. This is Darwin‟s theory of natural selection, 
which selects the most adaptive solutions to environmental problems and 
incorporates them into the structure of the psychological mechanism (p. 
9).  
 
In other words, if a trait is helpful in solving a particular adaptive problem in the 
individual‟s environment, this trait will be passed down through the individual‟s 
offspring because it is adaptive. In this way the process of natural selection can be 
imagined, retrospectively, to design the organism‟s physical structure over time. 
Natural selection provides a causal account of the relationship between adaptive 
problems and the particular design features of organisms. 
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3.4.3 The environment of evolutionary adaptedness  
 
If the brain is an information processing machine, in order to understand how 
the information is processed, we need to first understand what the input is. The input 
is in fact the adaptive problems that our brains evolved to solve in past 
environments; not those in the current environments. Thus, in order to understand 
the design of the mind, we are required to understand the environment of 
evolutionary adaptedness (EEA).  
The EEA is the environment in which humans were hunters and gatherers of 
resources in the wild (Cosmides & Tooby, 1997). The EEA for humans is loosely 
characterized as the Pleistocene period - the two million year period that our 
ancestors spent as hunter-gathers in the African savannah (Buss, 1995). This was 
the environment in which humans evolved over millions of years. This being so, 
many of our current adaptations are geared to life in the EEA as they were designed 
to solve the problems that confronted our ancestors, rather than meet contemporary 
challenges. In present day society, we live in environments where many aspects are 
new compared to that of the EEA: rapid travel, artificial lighting, permanent 
settlements, etc, for example, these environmental changes and challenges are 
recent compared to the vast period of evolutionary time, and this time span is 
certainly not long enough to facilitate adaptive responses to these new conditions in 
human minds or bodies. As Tooby and Cosmides mention: 
 
“The few thousand years since the scattered appearance of agriculture is only a 
small stretch in evolutionary terms, less than 1% of the two million years our 
ancestors our ancestors spent as Pleistocene hunter-gatherers. For this reason, it is 
unlikely that new complex designs – ones requiring the coordinated assembly of 
many novel, functionally integrated features – could evolve in so few generations” 
(Tooby and Cosmides, 1990)   
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Thus, as Hagen (2005) remarks, “the structure of an organism‟s EEA can be a 
masterful guide to the structure of the organism, including its brain” (p. 156). This 
environment, and its conditions, defined the adaptive problems the mind was shaped 
to cope with; in the case of humans, hunter gather conditions, rather than modern 
conditions.  
To demonstrate why evolutionary psychologists study the EEA, consider the 
popular example in evolutionary psychology of the widespread fear of snakes that 
humans hold. This fear is largely unjustified, as most of us spend our lives in 
industrialised, suburban areas, in which we are never exposed to snakes. Habitation 
in these areas is relatively recent in evolutionary terms. The vast majority of human 
evolution was spent in the Pleistocene environment where there would have been 
frequent encounters with venomous snakes. A fear of snakes, which would generate 
snake-avoidance behaviours, is well designed for those environments. Further, if 
there was a genotype that was selected during the Pleistocene, it would still be 
present in modern human populations, as there have been too few generations 
since the Pleistocene for genetic evolution to eradicate the genotype. Thus, the 
wide-spread fear of snakes is a product of a mind that is adapted to the conditions of 
human evolution during the Pleistocene. Pinker (2002) argues that there are 
similarities for many human fears, such as; heights, storms, carnivores, strangers, 
and blood. Pinker also argues that in modern society, the sight of a car or gun 
should evoke more fear than that of a snake. However, there have been too few 
generations since the inventions of either of these two items for selection to 
proliferate any genotype for a fear of either. 
This is why evolutionary psychologists focus on hunter gatherer societies rather 
than on modern society; our psychological traits are those of the hunter gathers, 
because possessing these traits advanced reproductive success in ancestral 
environments. The explanatory power of evolutionary psychology emerges from the 
concept of the EEA, for the structure of the ancestral environment is the basis and 
content for evolutionary psychology.  
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3.4.4 Modularity 
 
Evolutionary psychologists focus on studying the EEA and on developing and 
testing models of the psychological adaptations (mechanisms and behavioural 
strategies) that may have evolved as solutions to environmental challenges 
(Cosmides, Tooby & Barkow, 1992). By doing so, they hope to identify the selection 
pressures that might have shaped the evolution of certain traits in our ancestral past. 
Evolutionary psychologists do so because the mind is seen as a computational 
mechanism that consists of many domain-specific psychological modules. These 
evolved information-processing mechanisms embedded in the human nervous 
system are specialised for solving specific adaptive tasks. Because these 
mechanisms are helpful in solving particular adaptive problems in the organism‟s 
environment, they enhance reproductive fitness and are passed down through the 
organism‟s offspring. Thus, a central assumption of evolutionary psychology is that 
the human brain is comprised of many specialized psychological mechanisms that 
were shaped by natural selection over vast periods of time to solve the information 
processing problems faced by our ancestors (Ketelaar, 2002).  The EEA was so rich 
and heterogeneous during the time of our ancestors that in order to sort and process 
the vast amount of input, our brains developed modularity.  EP hypothesise that 
psychological mechanisms take the form of modules.  The notion of modularity, 
draws on the work of Jerry Fodor (1983), whose book Modularity of Mind provided a 
basis for this research program (Scher & Rauscher, 2002).  These modules are 
defined as specific-purpose mini-computers which are each dedicated to solving 
certain problems relating to particular aspects of survival and reproduction (Buller, 
2005).  Modularity can be defined as the proposition that the mind contains many, 
functionally isolatable sub-units, each specialised to process different kinds of 
information (Buss, 2005).  Modules themselves can be further defined; they are 
domain-specific in that they solve particular related problems which differ between 
modules.  They each develop without direct instruction in the problem domain, which 
is because modules embody innate knowledge; that is, they come to a problem 
already knowing a lot about it.  Furthermore, the information within each module is 
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isolated from cognitive processing occurring in other parts of the brain.  This 
isolation in turn allows for relatively faster processing (Buller, 2005).  The properties 
that modules contain, strongly resemble what were traditionally called instincts.  
Cosmides and Tooby describe these purpose-specific computational systems as 
learning and reasoning instincts (Buller, 2005).   
The two most central properties of modules are the fact that they are domain 
specific and informationally encapsulated.  These two properties will be further 
discussed in this next section. Firstly, domain specificity is an important part of many 
biological and physiological adaptations.  EP argues that domain specificity is also a 
very important property of psychological adaptations as well.  The human body is 
massively modular; the heart serves the specific function of pumping blood through 
the body, the kidney serves the specific function of extracting waste nitrogen and the 
lungs serve the function of providing the body with oxygen.  As our body has 
adapted with domain-specific organs, so has our brain adapted with domain specific 
modules, each of which relates to specific aspects of survival and reproduction.  The 
most important feature of the modules is the fact that they are domain specific as 
opposed to domain general structures.  The domain is a subset of the environment 
in which the organism operates (Scher & Rauscher, 2002).   
By saying that a cognitive structure is domain specific, one is stating that it has 
evolved to solve a specific class of problems.  Just like a Swiss army knife, which 
has many parts specific for certain tasks, the brain has certain modules for solving 
specific problems (Badcock, 2003).  Structures which are domain specific may have 
advantages over those which are domain general, such as the ability to process 
information at a faster rate in a more detailed fashion.  Evolutionary psychologists 
believe that the flexibility of the mind does not stem from a flexible, domain-general 
mechanism, but rather from many specific modules (Scher & Rauscher, 2002).  
Some evolutionary psychologists claim that modules can be differentiated from one 
another because they require qualitatively different rules for the solution of their 
corresponding adaptive problem (Scher & Rauscher, 2002).   
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Just as there is no one computer program which can solve all of the computer 
problems, there is no one module which can solve all of the psychological 
problems – in order to solve specific problems, specific knowledge, and thus specific 
modules, are needed (Scher & Rauscher, 2002).  Because many computer 
programs are required, so are many modules required.  Transformations of 
information are just as complex as any physical transformation and require equally 
complex mechanisms to complete the task.  Thus psychological adaptations are 
likely to be just as specific as any other adaptation. 
Secondly, the modules are information capsules.  Evolutionary psychologists 
believe that the problems faced by our ancestors in their environment led to the 
development of hundreds, if not thousands, of these domain-specific modules.  
Being so specific, the modules are seen as being informationally encapsulated 
(Fodor, 1983) This means that each module is specialised to process a specific kind 
of input, and thus has a functionality which is contained within the module and is 
specific to it.  In order to solve problems, minds combine modules – for example, a 
friendship module, a grammar acquisition module, a sexual attraction module, a fear 
module and so on (Barkow, Cosmides & Tooby, 1992).   
Thus, evolutionary psychology holds the perspective that “humans have a 
faculty of social cognition, consisting of a rich collection of recurrent adaptive 
problems posed by the social world” (Hagen, 2005, p. 162).  Thus, each of the 
specific-task solving modules, work separately in order to produce a final goal or 
coordinated functional outcome such as phenome recognition, syntax acquisition, 
object recognition or colour constancy.  Rather than the mind being seen as a mere 
learning device that is programmed by culture, the mind is viewed as a set of highly 
specialised, content-rich, domain-specific mental modules 
 
  
3.4.5 The methodology of evolutionary psychology 
 
Evolutionary psychologists discover evolved psychological mechanisms by 
engaging in a systematic process of reverse engineering, which is guided by 
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evolutionary theory (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). In comparison to forward 
engineering, which involves designing a particular thing for a particular purpose or to 
serve a particular function, reverse engineering involves starting with a final working 
design and taking it apart in order to discover how it works (Ketelaar, 2002). In this 
way, evolutionary psychologists are engineers working in reverse.  
Reverse engineering, the general method of evolutionary psychologists, is the 
process whereby we attempt to figure out what a machine was designed to do and 
how it works by looking at the machine‟s structure and hypothesising that it was 
designed to fit a number of specific functions. As part of the process of reverse 
engineering, evolutionary psychologists attempt to identify the key environmental 
problems of our ancestors in the Pleistocene environment, which would have posed 
challenges to survival and that needed to be solved to ensure the continuation of the 
species. In order to produce evidence of a fit between a mechanisms design and its 
proposed function, an evolutionary psychologist needs to identify an aspect of the 
organism‟s development or behaviour as an adaptation based on the following three 
criteria (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005, p. 28). Firstly, an organism has many design 
features that are very well suited to solving a particular ancestral problem, secondly, 
that these are unlikely to have arisen by chance, and lastly that they are not better 
explained as having developed to solve another particular adaptive problem. From 
this position, a researcher then hypothesises the existence of a psychological 
mechanism/s which would be needed to deal with these problems. They then 
explain how these physical and cognitive processes would produce output in 
behaviour and in human social and physical development. For example, by utilising 
scientific techniques, evolutionary psychologists test for the presence of a particular 
cognitive process under analysis. A successful test would give a positive result for 
the existence of an adaptive cognitive mechanism based on the solution of a 
particular problem a human would have faced in the EEA. Tooby & Cosmides (2005) 
explain this as such:  
 
There is a systematic method which can be used in evolutionary 
psychology for trying to understand unknown properties of the mind 
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using the concept of good design based on adaptive properties. This 
starts with the researcher isolating an adaptive problem which may have 
been encountered by our ancestors, and developing a model of the 
kinds of computations necessary for solving that problem, with an 
emphasis on good design. Based on this, hypotheses can be made 
around the kinds of programs which might have evolved in response to 
the problem. Then the hypotheses are tested using a range of 
experimental methods from cognitive, social and developmental 
psychology, and other disciplines (p. 28) 
 
They elaborate on this process by suggesting that in order to investigate 
cognitive mechanisms, the first step is to identify and isolate the adaptive problems 
that our ancestors would have been required to solve in their environments (i.e., the 
hunter-gather environment in the Plesitocence period). The next step would be to 
construct a theory of the specific cognitive mechanism that would solve a particular 
adaptive problem. With this theory of the specific cognitive mechanism we can then 
hypothesise about the kinds of programmes which might have evolved in response 
to a particular adaptive problem, and then explain how the mechanisms would be 
manifest in our development and behaviour. On this basis, we then utilise a range of 
experimental methods from cognitive, social and developmental psychology to test 
the existence of these cognitive mechanisms.  
 
To summarise the main components of evolutionary psychology, evolutionary 
psychologists focus on studying the environment of evolutionary adaptiveness and 
on developing and testing models of the psychological adaptations (mechanisms 
and behavioural strategies) that may have evolved as solutions to environmental 
challenges. By doing so, they hope to identify the selection pressures that might 
have shaped the evolution of certain traits in our ancestral past. Evolutionary 
psychologists do so because the mind is seen as a computational mechanism that 
consists of many domain-specific psychological modules. These evolved 
information-processing mechanisms embedded in the human nervous system are 
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specialised for solving specific adaptive tasks. Because these mechanisms are 
helpful in solving particular adaptive problems in the organism‟s environment, they 
aid reproduction and are passed down through the organism‟s offspring. Thus, a 
central assumption of evolutionary psychology is that the human brain is comprised 
of many specialized psychological mechanisms that were shaped by natural 
selection over vast periods of time to solve the information processing problems 
faced by our ancestors. The example of human mating provides a good example of 
evolutionary psychology‟s components and methods. 
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4. CASE STUDY: HUMAN MATING STRATEGIES 
 
To date, evolutionary psychologists have been very successful in mate-
selection research. The following case study discusses one of their most prominent 
research projects in mate-selection and explains how their methodology is beneficial 
in gathering empirical evidence to support their theories.  
Evolutionary psychologists look at how males and females undergo mate-
selection in today‟s society. Studies have shown that males and females have 
different preferences when selecting a mate. However, when comparing females 
across cultures, their preferences are very similar. The same has been found for 
males. Evolutionary psychologists maintain that the preferences are „universal‟, 
which means that they are observable, across all cultures, throughout social classes, 
religious groups, all ethnic groups, and all relevant ages of the life cycle (Buller, 
2005). For example, across cultures, males “express a desire for females younger 
than they are” and place higher importance on beauty and youthfulness (Buss, 
1999), whereas females express a desire for men older than they are, and desire a 
mate with “good financial prospects” (Buss, 1999). These findings indicate that the 
preferences for mate-selection are not learned, but rather have an evolutionary 
basis.  
Evolutionary psychologists can use reverse engineering to identify the 
psychological mechanisms governing human mate-selection. They first need to 
identify the adaptations formed by the selection pressures generated by the EEA. 
The next step is to identify the various strategies used in mate-selection, and from 
there to identify the psychological mechanisms involved in these strategies. This 
example will be presented in three sections: firstly, the adaptations developed from 
the selection pressures of the EEA, secondly how parental investment can explain 
what causes males and females to use different strategies when selecting their 
mates, and finally a discussion of the importance of understanding psychological 
mechanisms in mate-selection in order to make predictions of various behaviours, 
such as jealousy.  
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4.1 Adaptations for mate-selection 
 
First, evolutionary psychologist‟s use reverse engineering to look at the hunter-
gather Pleistocene period in order to understand why humans have particular 
cognitive mechanisms for specific mating strategies. We have seen that all 
organisms have been naturally selected for their ability to successfully reproduce 
and pass on their genes (Buss, 1999). As there is no way to directly study the 
hunter-gatherer society, evolutionary psychologist‟s make the assumption that 
natural selection created adaptations that increased our ancestors' reproductive 
success. Further theories are developed and tested to provide support for this core 
theory of natural selection. This assumption of natural selection is the highest level 
of the evolutionary theory. Evolutionary psychology requires a middle-level theory in 
order to test the highest level theory for understanding human mate-selection. This 
middle-level theory is that of parental investment, and it has been used to support 
the mate-selection theory.  
  
4.2 Parental investment 
 
Evolutionary psychologists have used parental investment theory to understand 
how humans choose their mates. The theory focuses on the sex differences in 
parental investment which lead to sex differences in mating strategies (Buss, 1999). 
The theory posits that, because males and females invest differently in the 
production of offspring, they will employ different criteria when choosing a mate, 
which relate to their ability to be a parent. One such hypothesis builds on the sex 
differences in time and energy devoted to the production and care of individual 
offspring (Buss, 1995). Generally females invest more, and males less. According to 
Trivers (1971), “the greater parental investment of females makes them a valuable 
reproductive resource” and males will compete for access to this resource. Thus, the 
sex that invests more in offspring (typically females) will be more discriminating 
when choosing a mate, and the sex that invests less will be more competitive with 
other members of that sex for sexual access to the higher investing sex. As a 
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consequence of their smaller investment, males are more aggressive and compete 
more vigorously for reproductive access to females (Buss, 1999). They are also less 
discriminating in mate choice, willing to mate more quickly, and with more partners 
(Buss, 1999). It is hypothesised that all these aspects occur so that males benefit 
reproductively from doing so. However, in our own species, a substantial investment 
in parenting is made by both sexes, because in order to successfully produce and 
raise a child in the long-term, both men and women invest heavily in the child, and 
so the theory of parental investment predicts that in humans both sexes should be 
choosy and discriminating when forming long term partnerships. It is only when a 
pair bond is formed, as in humans and birds, that we find a similar amount of 
parental investment from both the mother and father. 
Another such hypothesis of the theory is that because women are strictly 
limited in the capacity to reproduce, men will prefer to form partnerships with more 
fertile females, and thus father more offspring. Because men have chosen more 
fertile females in the past, they have evolved a preference for fertility, and thus, 
psychological mechanisms that enable men to recognise certain characteristics of 
fertility in women. This includes women who are physically sexually attractive, and 
generally younger. Trivers (1972) maintains that the hypothesis that men prefer 
younger women is based on the assumptions that:  
 
1. During the evolutionary past, the preference for certain physical 
properties of young women was a tendency which could be passed 
down from generation to generation. 
2. Males who preferred younger women reproduced more than other 
males. 
3. Natural selection evolved psychological mechanisms for the preference 
of younger women. 
4. Genes for this preference became established in human gene-pools. 
 
Thus, the criteria for choosing a mate centred on the woman‟s capacity to have 
children. This was complicated, as there are no obvious outward signs of fertility in 
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human females. The emphasis thus shifted to males learning to recognise the signs 
of fertility, which were based on the observable cues, such as youth and health. 
Evolutionary psychologists take the view that what men desire is not youth or health 
per se, but that these features are associated with reproductive value and fertility. 
The evolutionary psychological explanation is that men desire young women 
because over evolutionary time, youth has constantly been linked with fertility and 
reproduction. In other words, the adaptive problem of survival and reproduction for 
males has been met with the psychological mechanism that selects for youth and 
health. In contrast, females have evolved preferences for males high in social status 
who have an ability to contribute resources, and for men who show a willingness to 
invest in women and their offspring. Women of the hunter-gather period were faced 
with the vulnerability and stress of a nine-month pregnancy and much longer period 
of child rearing. Thus, they benefited from choosing a mate with greater access to 
resources, because this helped them to solve their adaptive problems of both 
survival and reproduction. Thus selection pressure led to the evolution of the 
adaptive psychological mechanisms for this preference. Therefore, given that the 
process of choosing a mate is based on different adaptive criteria for men and 
women, we can expect that different cognitive mechanisms have evolved in men 
and women.  
 
4.3 Jealousy prediction 
 
If these hypotheses about parental investment are supported, then evolutionary 
psychologists can predict the evolved psychological mechanism of human jealousy. 
Here evolutionary psychologists are interested in whether male sexual jealousy 
varies in intensity according to the magnitude of male parental investment, or 
whether female jealousy decreases as a function of decreases in a males resources. 
An evolutionary analysis shows that the sexes will differ in the weight they give to 
the cues that trigger sexual jealousy (Buss, 1999). As predicted, men give more 
weight to cues that signal sexual infidelity, whereas women give more weight to cues 
which signal emotional involvement with another person. Sexual infidelity matters 
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more to men because they could be tricked into helping to raise the children of 
another man. On the other hand, emotional involvement is more important for 
women because it may lead to desertion by the man, abandoning them and their 
offspring.  
Thus, by posing a more specific question about jealousy that focuses on the 
triggers for jealousy, the empirical findings of the evolutionary psychologists have 
isolated a sex-difference in jealousy which had previously gone unnoticed. This 
finding is an example that shows that humans have evolved cognitive mechanisms 
specific to the sex-linked adaptive problems they recurrently faced over evolutionary 
history. As a result, male jealousy appears to be more sensitive to sexual infidelity, 
whereas female jealousy is more sensitive to emotional infidelity. 
However, questions still remain as to whether evolutionary psychology is 
scientific in its endeavour to study the human mind and behaviour. There is also the 
question as to whether evolutionary psychology can integrate with the rest of 
science and whether it provides an efficient strategy for doing so. These questions 
are addressed firstly, by a fuller consideration of the philosophy of science.  
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5. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
 
This chapter discusses two influential philosophies of science: those of Karl 
Popper (1959) and Imre Lakatos (1970, 1978). The purpose of discussing these two 
particular philosophies of science is that there has been a long history of an 
empiricist philosophy of science in psychology, and Popper‟s philosophy of science 
has often been cited by psychologists.  I discuss Lakatos‟s philosophy of science 
because it is a more contemporary philosophy of science which is more applicable to 
psychology, especially evolutionary psychology, and has the potential to make 
psychology a more scientific enterprise.  
This theoretical discussion is necessary as there are questions as to whether 
evolutionary psychology is scientific in its efforts to study the human mind and 
behaviour. A number of authors in fact consider evolutionary psychology not to be a 
scientific enterprise (e.g., Buller, 2005; Panksepp & Panksepp, 2000). These writers 
assert that the methods used by evolutionary psychology in order to generate and 
test evolutionary explanations are simply not good enough to be considered part of 
the science of evolutionary biology (Ketelaar & Ellis, 2000). The main claim is that 
evolutionary psychological theories are largely based and built upon assumptions 
which cannot be effectively tested, and thus the data cannot be considered as 
scientific. For example, evolutionary psychology has been accused of being 
„untestable‟ (Gould, 2000), „reductionist‟ (Rose, 1998), and that it relies on 
speculation about an EEA that we know little about (Siegert & Ward, 2002). In other 
words, evolutionary psychology uses hypothesised adaptationist scenarios that look 
into the past in order to explain evolution of a physical or behavioural feature 
(Siegart & Ward, 2002). In doing this, it is claimed that evolutionary psychology fails 
to achieve the goal of providing the conceptual tools for emerging from the current 
fragmented state of psychological theory.  
However, I suggest that by embracing a Lakatosian philosophy of science  
evolutionary psychology can be considered scientific. Moreover, I maintain that 
evolutionary psychology can utilise this philosophy of science to integrate effectively 
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with the rest of science. Thus, a fuller consideration of these two philosophies of 
science is warranted.  
 
5.1 Popper’s philosophy of science 
 
Karl Popper (1959) rejected classical empiricism (Rosenberg, 2005). This is the 
view in philosophy of science that knowledge is derived from experience, in 
particular from experimentation (Rosenberg, 2005). According to this view, the 
scientific method requires that hypotheses be tested against the observations of the 
world, rather than from reasoning or intuition (Rosenberg, 2005). Instead, Popper 
demarcated science from pseudoscience by introducing the notion of 
falsificationism. Here scientific explanations consist of statements (or hypotheses) 
that are empirically tested to determine whether they “support” the data (are 
corroborated) or are inconsistent with the data (are falsified). As Popper (1959) has 
commented:  
 
We seek a decision as regards these (and other) derived statements by 
comparing them with the results of practical applications and experiments. 
If this decision is positive, that is, if the singular conclusions turn out to be 
acceptable, or verified, then the theory has, for the time being, passed its 
test: we have found no reason to discard it. But if the decision is negative, 
or in other words, if the conclusions have been falsified, then their 
falsification also falsifies the theory from which they were logically 
deduced (p. 33).  
 
In other words, the method of falsification serves to evaluate the scientific 
status of particular hypotheses and predictions. According to Popper (1959), a 
theory should be considered scientific only if it is falsifiable because the truth content 
of theories cannot be verified by scientific testing; they can only be falsified. 
The cognitive scientist Alan Newell (1973, 1990), has argued that psychology 
has largely utilised a Popperian philosophy of science in order to discover truths 
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about the mind by way of revealing particular falsehoods. Newell argued that with 
such an approach the mind is revealed by accumulating negative knowledge about 
what the mind is not and does not do. From this base of negative knowledge, 
positive knowledge about how the mind is and what the mind does do (how it 
operates) is inferred by considering various explanations that are left unrefuted. 
Essentially Newell argued that Popper‟s strategy was not an efficient strategy for 
advancing positive knowledge about how complex mental processes operate. Null 
hypothesis testing was seen as a specific problem in that it merely allows the 
researcher to calculate the probablility of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is in 
fact true. Newell believed that the slow rate of progress, and a lack of cumulative 
progress, in psychology is directly due to the acceptance of an empiricist philosophy 
of science, in particular the strategy of null hypothesis testing. Therefore he 
suggested that psychology ought to replace the discriminating approach of a 
Popperian philiosophy of science with a different, more productive, philosophy of 
science.  
Whilst the method of falsificationism was seen as useful for evaluating the 
scientific status of specific hypotheses and predictions, others also saw falsification 
as inappropriate for directly evaluating theories and the meta-theoretical 
assumptions that generate such predictions and hypotheses (e.g, see Ketelaar and 
Elis, 2000). In the words of Lloyd (1979), a meta-theory “provides a guide and 
prevents certain kinds of errors, raises suspicions of certain explanations or 
observations, suggests lines of research to be followed, and provides a sound 
criterion for recognising significant observations on natural phenomena” (p. 18). In 
this regard falsificationism has been challenged on both descriptive and normative 
grounds (see Ketelaar, 2002). As Newell (1990) remarks:  
 
Theories are approximate. Of course, we all know that technically they are 
approximate; the world can‟t be known with absolute certainty. But I mean 
more than that. Theories are deliberately approximate….They are defined 
and reformulated, corrected and expanded. Thus, we are not in the world 
of Popper, as far as I‟m concerned... Working with theories is not like 
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skeet shooting – where theories are lofted up and bang, they are shot 
down with a falsification bullet, and that‟s the end of the story. Theories 
are more like graduate students – once admitted you try hard to avoid 
flunking them out…Theories are things to be nurtured and changed and 
built up. One is happy to change them to make them more useful (p. 14). 
 
Newell (1990) was critical of the lack of a coherent unifying meta-theory to 
guide the research endeavour in psychology. He argued that because researchers 
were operating without a larger meta-theoretical framework to guide the construction 
and evaluation of various alternative explanations, they had no explicit guidelines for 
separating the a priori plausible (alternative) explanations or the a priori implausible 
(null) explanations (Newell, 1973). Instead Newell contended that the more 
approximating approach proposed by Imre Lakatos (1970, 1978) was more 
advantageous as one of the endeavours of psychology is to increase our knowledge 
base by constructing better and better approximations of phenomena based on 
current theory. Lakatos‟ approach provided such a coherent unifying meta-theory. 
 
5.2 Lakatos’ philosophy of science 
 
Imre Lakatos (1970, 1978), a former student of Popper, has proposed an 
approximating approach which is comprised of two central features. These features 
are that meta-theoretical research programmes are comprised of several levels of 
analysis, and that they adhere to a criterion of research progressiveness. The first 
feature of this philosophy of science is that meta-theoretical research programmes 
are comprised of several levels of analysis, which centre on basic hardcore 
assumptions. These basic hardcore assumptions comprise the meta-theory, and are 
the defining characteristic and guiding metaphors of a research programme. Lakatos 
contends that scientists rely on basic meta-theoretical assumptions when they 
construct and evaluate theories. Once these assumptions have been empirically 
established, they are often not directly tested thereafter (Ketelaar, 2002). Instead 
these assumptions are utilised as a starting point for further research. Examples are 
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the principles of gradualism and plate tectonics which are the basic assumptions 
which provide a meta-theory for the discipline of geology.  
Below the basic hardcore assumptions, is the protective belt which consists of 
middle-level theories, hypotheses, and predictions. The protective belt provides an 
empirically verifiable means of linking the hard core basic assumptions to observable 
data, and also provides indirect evidence in support of the meta-theoretical basic 
assumptions. Middle level theories themselves consist of applications of a particular 
set of meta-theoretical assumptions to a distinct content domain. From a single 
middle-level theory, a wide number of hypotheses can be derived. These 
hypotheses vary along a continuum of confidence. From these hypotheses, 
predictions are derived which correspond to specific statements about the state of 
the world that one would expect to observe if the hypotheses were verified. When 
the data fail to support a prediction, one goes back to the drawing board. The 
performance of the predictions provides the basis for evaluating the more general 
hypotheses from which they are drawn. In essence, predictions represent explicit, 
testable instantiations of the hypotheses. Ultimately, the value of the more general 
hypothesis and theoretical model is judged by the cumulative weight of the evidence. 
Basic hardcore assumptions are also sometimes referred to as „negative 
heuristics‟. An heuristic are rules of thumb that aid discovery or invention. In contrast 
to negative heuristics, positive heuristics provide guidance on how the hard core 
basic assumptions are to be supplemented by the protective belt, and how this 
protective belt is to be modified in order for a programme to produce explanations 
and predictions of observable phenomena. As Lakatos (1970) comments, “the 
positive heuristic consists of a partially articulated set of suggestions or hints on how 
to change, develop, the „refutable variants‟ of the research program, how to modify, 
sophisticate, the „refutable‟ protective belt” (p. 135).  
The second feature of Lakatos‟ philosophy of science is the criterion of 
research progressiveness. Here competing research programmes are judged as 
progressive or degenerative, rather than as false or „as yet not falsified‟ (Lakatos, 
1970, 1978). Research programmes are judged progressive or degenerative in 
regard to their explanatory and predictive power. For instance, when a research 
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programme contributes only marginally to the advancement of knowledge, this 
explanatory system is viewed as degenerative rather than progressive. As Lakatos 
(1978) puts it: 
 
A research program is said to be progressing as long as its theoretical 
growth anticipates its empirical growth, that is as long as it keeps 
predicting novel facts with some success („progressive problemshift‟); it is 
stagnating if its theoretical growth lags behind its empirical growth, that is 
as long as it gives only post hoc explanations whether of chance 
discoveries or of facts anticipated by, and discovered in, a rival 
programme („degenerative problemshift‟) (p.11). 
 
In other words, instead of searching for confirmatory or disconfirmatory 
evidence as happens with orthadox hypothesis testing, Lakatos suggests evaluating 
explanations by sorting through a set of plausible alternative accounts which are 
then evaluated relative to each other rather than on their own. A theory should be 
retained if it is the best available explanation, even if the theory has experienced 
predictive failures, for a theory cannot be rejected on the basis of observation unless 
a superior alternative theory exists. A new theory is generated after a novel 
observation and should be theoretically consistent with known facts, predict new 
facts, and the prediction of new facts should turn out to be empirically verified. Thus, 
confirmations, rather than falsifications, are of predominant importance, and the 
worth and merit of a research programme is shown by the extent to which it provides 
novel predictions that are confirmed. As Galison (1988) remarks, “as long as the 
adding of auxiliary assumptions led to fruitful new discoveries and explanations, the 
program was progressive; when the auxiliary assumptions needed to protect the 
core began contributing only marginally to the advancement of learning, the program 
„degenerated‟ and was discarded” (p. 204). This highlights the fact that the feedback 
process between the theory and obtained data is critical to acquiring knowledge and 
allowing the judgement of progress.  
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To summarise Lakatos‟s approach, the hard core basic assumptions are 
surrounded by a protective belt of middle level theories and auxiliary hypotheses, 
which in turn are connected to observable data. Lakatos‟s (1978) point is that the 
auxiliary hypotheses surround the basic assumptions and these hypotheses are 
empirically tested and “adjusted and readjusted, or even replaced, to defend the 
thus hardened-core” (Lakatos, p. 48). Thus it is not the basic assumptions 
themselves of the research programme that are adjusted or readjusted. Hence 
scientists are actually relying on the hard core basic assumptions as a starting point 
for constructing and evaluating theories, and they seek to solve problems by 
modifying the more peripheral assumptions of the protective belt rather than the hard 
core basic assumptions. As Ketelaar and Ellis (2000) note, “a scientist using an 
approximating approach begins with a set of first principles on which everyone in the 
field can agree and then structures scientific progress around the task of using these 
principles to construct theoretical models – approximations – of particular 
phenomena” (p.3). 
Newtonian physics provides a good example of Lakatos‟s philosophy of science 
in operation. With Newtonian physics, the hard core is comprised of Newton‟s three 
laws of motion and his law of gravitational attraction (Rosenberg, 2005). These four 
laws form the meta-theory for the field of classical mechanics. Following a 
Lakatosian approach, one accepts these laws and seeks to modify the assumptions 
and theories in the protective belt. The assumptions are modified in an attempt to 
improve the match between the predictions of the programme (i.e., classical 
mechanics) and the results of observation and experiment in the world. In such a 
case there may be several competing middle-level theories, such as the competing 
wave and particle theories of light in quantum physics (Matthews, 1994), however 
neither of these theories contradict the hard core basic assumptions of Newtonian 
physics (i.e., Newton‟s laws of mechanics). These theories are derived from the hard 
core basic assumptions and are evaluated on their own merits, with the expectation 
that eventually one will prevail. If, on the other hand, there was no meta-theory to 
provide hard core basic assumptions, there would be no theories of light or even of 
quantum physics.  
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6. THE INTEGRATION OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 
AND SCIENCE 
 
This chapter builds on the previous chapters and argues that the methods and 
strategies that evolutionary psychologists utilise to generate and test hypotheses are 
scientifically defensible. They are defensible because they are in line with a 
Lakatosian philosophy of science a more contemporary philosophy of science than 
that pf Popper. I also contend that the explanations of evolutionary psychologists are 
more useful than general psychological explanations which rely on a Popperian 
philosophy of science, and as such, these more useful explanations should be 
adopted. In order to justify this position, I review and expand on the principles of a 
Lakatosian philosophy of science. In doing so, I outline how these principles are 
used to construct and evaluate meta-theoretical research programmes, and how 
they are employed to evaluate the endeavours of evolutionary psychologists.  
 
6.1 Evolutionary psychology and Lakatos’ philosophy of science 
 
Consistent with Lakatos‟s philosophy of science (Lakatos, 1970, 1978), 
evolutionary psychologists employ multiple levels of explanation (Ketelaar & Ellis, 
2000) in explaining various psychological phenomena. In this regard, the basic 
assumptions and tenets of modern evolutionary theory are taken as bedrock and 
assumed correct. These are the core meta-theoretical assumptions from the 
adaptationist programme in evolutionary biology, and consist of the general 
principles of genetical evolution drawn from modern evolutionary theory (see Buss, 
1995). Working from these basic hardcore assumptions, evolutionary psychologists 
generate mid-level theories and hypotheses in order to analyse how they can be 
applied to our understanding of human behaviour. Buss provides a nice visual 
representation of the multiple levels of explanations of psychological mechanisms 
(from Ketelaar & Ellis, 2000): 
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Figure 1. The hierarchical structure of evolutionary psychological mechanisms. 
 
These levels of explanation begin at the meta-theoretical level with the 
assumptions of modern evolutionary theory. From here, evolutionary psychology 
organises the protective belt into three levels: middle-level theories, hypotheses, and 
predictions. As Buss (1995) remarks, “middle-level evolutionary theories are 
consistent with and subsumed by evolutionary meta-theory” (p. 10). The middle-level 
theories elaborate the basic assumptions of the meta-theory, in this case 
evolutionary theory, a particular psychological domain. Then hypotheses and 
predictions of that domain are generated (i.e., evolutionary psychologists utilise 
meta-theory to guide hypothesis generation). This is how evolutionary psychological 
explanations of phenomena involve multiple levels of explanation and analysis. As 
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Ketelaar (2002) remarks, “because the basic assumptions of one‟s meta-theory can 
be combined with an array of auxiliary assumptions, several hypotheses can be 
derived from a single middle-level theory and these hypotheses might differ from 
those generated by competing theories, even if both theories share many of the 
same meta-theoretical assumptions” (p. 46). The finer points of these four levels of 
explanation (the meta-theory and the three levels in the protective belt) are further 
described by Ketelaar and Ellis (Ketelaar & Ellis, 2000; Ketelaar, 2002).  
Consistent with Lakatos‟ philosophy of science, evolutionary psychology meets 
the criterion of progressivity (Lakatos, 1970, 1978) based on its ability to account for 
apparent anomalies and generate novel predictions and explanations. As such, it 
has the properties of a currently progressive research programme (Ketelaar & Ellis, 
2000). In comparison to other psychological paradigms, such as behaviourism, 
evolutionary psychology provides and utilises a meta-theory (i.e., evolutionary 
theory). Ketelaar (2002) notes that in doing so “it is a more reasonable (i.e., efficient 
and defensible) research strategy to put two competing evolutionary alternative 
explanations against each other rather than the more traditional approach of 
Popperian null hypothesis testing where plausible hypothesis against their logical 
opposites” (p. 47). For example, Buss (1995) pits attachment theory, parental 
investment theory, and reciprocal altruism theory against one other in order to 
explain the phenomena of mate selection (see Figure 1).  
However, in some research the middle-level theories do not always provide 
verifiable predictions. In such situations researchers need to revise their predictions 
or the middle-level theories. This is in keeping with the criterion of progressivity as 
when the data do not support the hypotheses, rather than disregarding the meta-
theory, a revision of the hypotheses is attempted or they are rejected, instead of 
disregarding the meta-theory. If these hypotheses fail, a re-evaluation of the mid-
level theories is then required. For example, in the case of jealousy, if the predictions 
fail, evolutionary psychologists revised their hypotheses and devise better 
hypothesis. An example of predictions failing can be seen in sexual selection as this 
theory did not take into consideration the length of relationships. It is known that 
there is a difference in how people choose their mates depending on whether their 
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coupling is expected to be short or long term (Buss, 1999). When looking for long 
term mates, females tend to prefer males with access to resources. However, when 
looking for a short-term mate, females prefer males who are more physically 
attractive (Buss, 1999). Thus, the predictions did not fit both short and long term 
coupling. In most cases, falsifying a specific prediction does not directly falsify the 
meta-theory (Ketelaar, 2002). In the above example, the limitation was that short 
and long-term relationships had not been distinguished; not that the theories were 
incorrect. The failure of predictions does not reflect on the core meta-theory, as 
these predictions are devised from the mid-level theories, not basic core 
assumptions.  
The case study of human mating discussed above can usefully be 
conceptualised from a Lakatosian perspective. In this case, the meta-theory consists 
of the core principles of evolutionary theory; that is, the general principles of 
genetical evolution drawn from modern evolutionary theory (i.e., natural and sexual 
selection). Evolutionary psychologists are not attempting to prove these principles, 
they are assumed to be correct. The protective belt is composed of theories derived 
from natural and sexual selection. In this case, the middle-level theory consists of 
parental investment theory which discusses the different ways in which males and 
females choose their mate. From this theory the hypothesis is that the higher 
investing sex would be the more selective and the less investing the more 
aggressive. It is also predicted that males would prefer youth and health, and 
females would prefer males with resources, that male jealousy would be triggered by 
sexual infidelity, and woman‟s by emotional infidelity. By utilising this hierarchical 
structure, evolutionary psychologists are able to test and support their basic core 
assumptions, to develop and refine subsequent theories, and to better understand 
and predict human behaviour. 
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6.2 The benefit of evolutionary psychology adopting a Lakatosian philosophy 
of science 
 
The explanations allowed by embracing a Lakatosian philosophy of science, 
and provided by evolutionary psychologists, are more useful than traditional 
psychological explanations (i.e., inferences derived from negative knowledge). In 
considering two competing alternative explanations, evolutionary psychology is both 
a more realistic view of how good science is practiced, and a more efficient research 
strategy than the alternative strategy of null hypothesis testing. As Lakatos (1970) 
remarks, 
 
…one theory may be judged as more useful than another because it 
possesses greater explanatory power, that is, it solves more of the 
existing puzzles and accounts for a wider range of known facts, including 
apparently anomalous findings. In addition to this ability to account (post 
hoc) for what is known, one middle-level theory may be judged as more 
useful than another because it possesses greater predictive power, that 
is, it better anticipates the data by specifying (a priori) previously 
unobserved phenomena (p. 80).  
 
The Popperian method of falsification is still useful under a Lakatosian 
approach for evaluating the scientific status of specific statements (predictions and 
hypotheses), as it is these that generally bear the burden of empirical test. However, 
falsification is an inadequate strategy for evaluating middle-level theories and the 
meta-theoretical assumptions that generate these hypotheses and predictions; 
competing approaches within human evolutionary psychology can be evaluated at 
any level, including the middle-level and meta-theory levels. Thus, falsifying a 
specific evolutionary prediction does not directly threaten evolutionary meta-theory, 
unless that prediction directly tests a hard core meta-theoretical assumption. 
Nonetheless, at each level of analysis, evaluation is based on the cumulative weight 
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of the evidence. These standards and procedures for evaluating evolutionary 
explanations are what Kuhn (1962) termed „normal paradigm science‟.  
Lakatos‟ approximating model of science is also better suited to the task of 
constructing theories for psychology, because it accommodates the development 
and testing of alternative evolutionary explanations within the unifying framework of 
a single meta-theory (evolutionary theory). As such, evolutionary psychology is 
capable of providing us with consistent procedures for developing and testing 
evolutionary models, which in turn provide new knowledge and novel explanations of 
how the human mind works. In drawing on evolutionary theory, evolutionary 
psychology aims to place the discipline of psychology alongside the natural 
sciences, and presnt itself as a “conceptually integrated theory” (Cosmides, Tooby & 
Barkow, 1992, p. 11), with the goal of conceptual integration in mind, Lakatosian 
theory has been adopted whole heartedly by evolutionary psychologists (see 
Ketelaar and Ellis, 2000), for it provides them with a firm structure upon which to 
base their theories. Lakatos‟ theory provides three main benefits. These are: not 
needing to directly test the hard core theory once it has been established, not 
disregarding theories on the basis of single inconsistent hypotheses, and the use of 
positive heuristics.  Each of these benefits will be further discussed. 
With Lakatosian theory, after the hard core theory has been established, it is 
not then necessary to continue to test and hypothesise on the theory.  This hard 
core theory is set in stone and is not questioned further.  For example, physicians do 
not question Newton‟s gravitational theory, but rather treat it as fact.  In evolutionary 
psychology, psychologists apply Darwin‟s theory of natural selection to study the 
human mind and behaviour.  Darwin‟s theory has withstood time and tests, and is 
now established as fact in the scientific world.  The meta-theory in evolutionary 
psychology is based on Darwin‟s natural selection which has been well established. 
Thus it is not necessary to directly test these foundations again.  The Lakatosian 
theory allows scientists to obtain a core theory which may not in itself be directly 
testable.  Rather than testing the hard core theory, the middle-level theories are 
tested by numerous hypotheses.  The middle-level theories are part of the protective 
belt, which has a primary function of providing empirically verifiable means of linking 
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meta-theoretical assumptions with observable data (Ketelaar & Ellis, 2000).  Thus, in 
such a research program, if one hypothesis turns up a discrepancy with a middle-
level theory, the hard core theory is not affected.  Rather, further hypotheses will be 
tested to see why the discrepancy occurred.  Thus, evolutionary psychology has a 
concrete foundation set in Darwin‟s natural selection theory.  Psychologists do not 
try to prove this foundation, but rather try to build upon it. 
The Lakatosian theory has another crucial benefit over the Popperian theory. 
This is its ability to identify where the falsification lies.  It is not logical to disregard a 
theory on the basis of one discrepancy.  Without further analysis, where that 
falsification lies may not be identifiable.  If the Popperian theory had been adopted 
when Newton was testing his theories, it is more than likely that his research would 
have been discarded.  In the early years, Newton‟s gravitational theory was falsified 
by observations of the moon‟s orbit (Chalmers, 1999).  It took almost fifty years to 
deflect this falsification onto factors other than Newton‟s theory.  The theory again 
came to be inconsistent with the orbit of Mercury.  Scientists did not abandon the 
theory on either of these two accounts (Chalmers, 1999).  Rather, further tests and 
hypotheses were created to gain further insight and support for the theory.  Thus, 
scientists cannot disregard a theory on the basis that a single test found 
inconsistencies.  The Lakatosian theory accomodates this and directs where the 
falsification lies, i.e., it may lie in the hypothesis or in the testing, not in the hard core 
of the theory. 
In the case of mate selection, evolutionary psychologists initially found 
discrepancies with the meta-theory.  As was seen in previous chapters, the 
hypotheses were not consistent with short and long term relationships.  Rather than 
disregard or throw out the hard core theory, further hypotheses were proposed and 
tested.  These latter hypotheses provided data consistent with the hard core theory.  
When observations and experiments provide data which is inconsistent with the 
meta-theory, it might be the data which is at fault rather than the theory (Chalmers, 
1999).  To throw out the theory on the basis of a discrepancy is not sound scientific 
strategy. 
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A further benefit of the Lakatosian theory is its use of positive heuristics.  The 
positive heuristic provides guidance on how the hard core theory is to be 
supplemented, and how the subsequent protective belt is to be modified in order to 
yield explanations and predictions of observable phenomena (Chalmers, 1999).  
This heuristic provides hints on how to modify and develop the protective belt.  
Lakatos provided an illustration of a positive heuristic with Newton‟s early 
development of his gravitational theory (Lakatos, 1978).  The positive heuristic 
involved starting out with idealised situations and slowly progressing to more realistic 
situations (Chalmers, 1999).  Starting with idealised cases allows theories to be 
proposed.  Once these idealised cases are mastered, one can proceed to more 
complicated cases and make adjustments to the theory in order to make the 
transition to realistic situations.   
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7. CRITICISMS OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 
 
We understand the goal of evolutionary psychology to be the discovery of the 
mental organs that constitute our universal human nature and how those mental 
organs function to solve evolutionary problems (Buller, 2005). Evolutionary 
psychology theory has a very strong structure which has been backed up by 
extensive research by psychologists. It has provided strong explanations for 
behaviour in several human situations, such as mate-selection and sexual-selection. 
As I have argued, Laktos‟ philosophy can successfully integrate evolutionary 
psychology with the rest of science. Thus, evolutionary psychology can provide a 
very powerful explanation for the human mind and behaviour.  
However, there are aspects of the human mind and behaviour which other 
psychologists do not believe can be fully accounted for by an evolutionary 
psychology perspective. I will discuss the following criticisms of the evolutionary 
psychological perspective; including the argument against modularity, the reliance 
on the Pleistocene period, the elimination of other causes of evolution, and the 
reliance on what appears to be „just so‟ stories.  
 
7.1 The criticism of domain-specific modularity 
 
The ultimate goal of evolutionary psychology is to discover the modularity of 
human psychological mechanisms in order to understand the human mind and 
behaviour. Evolutionary psychology emphasises that the brain is modular. The 
modern idea of modularity in evolutionary psychology was initiated by Jerry Fodor 
(1983) who claims the human brain is comprised of a discrete series of „mental 
modules‟ or „psychological mechanisms‟. It is because of this concept of modularity 
(i.e., the evolved cognitive structure of the brain) that evolutionary psychologists 
argue that psychology should be considered a biological science. These mental 
modules are not mapped onto specific brain structures, nevertheless our brains are 
specialised like a Swiss Army knife or a computer (Grace, 2000, p.5). For example, 
evolutionary psychologists claim the brain embraces many modules, including, for 
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example, modules for mate-selection, food selection, fear of snakes, and predator 
avoidance. The modules are so domain specific that they are considered 
informationally encapsulated and do not interact with each other.  
However, there are psychologists who do not agree with the theory of 
modularity. An initial example which has been offered to negate modularity is the 
discovery of the brain's ability to „recover‟ after the degeneration of certain regions or 
circuits (Buller, 2005). This has been termed neural plasticity, which refers to the 
ability of brain regions to perform different functions, so that a given brain region has 
the ability to take on the function of another region if required (Buller, 2005). The 
idea that the brain is able to do this negates the existence of domain specific 
modules. If domain-specific modules were to exist, there would be little or no room 
for reorganisation to occur following damage. However, it has been seen that the 
brain is able to create new or alternative pathways following damage to certain 
areas.  
A further criticism of modularity is that it has overcompensated for earlier more 
“general purpose” theories of the human brain by postulating the existence of 
hundreds of discrete modules. Dan Sperber (2001) comments that modularity seems 
to conflict with the way in which the brain processes conceptual information (i.e., in 
integrating information from the different modalities of taste, sounds, touch, sight), 
and the recent appearance of cultural pursuits which are culturally specific, yet were 
not found in the EEA (e.g., TV viewing). Sperber argues it “would be absurd to 
assume there is an ad hoc genetically specified preparedness for these culturally 
developed conceptual domains” (p. 33).  
These criticisms question the soundness of theoretical commitment of 
evolutionary psychology to modularity. Some also think that modularity might be 
more workable if it were supplemented with the idea of general purpose 
mechanisms working concurrently. 
An example which supports the overlap in brain circuitry is that which can be 
observed when maintaining balance. The semi-circular canals within the middle ear 
are responsible for maintaining balance. However, if these are removed from an 
individual, the brain compensates for the vestibular disturbance (Buller, 2005). When 
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the semi-circular canals are removed, the individual can recover their sense of 
balance very quickly. Some other sensory system must be feeding the brain with 
input about the environment. In such cases, the most likely explanation is that the 
visual system provides the brain with the required information (Buller, 2005). This 
degree of overlap within our brains shows that brain circuits are in fact not „domain-
specific‟ but rather, they are „domain dominant‟. Thus, they are predominantly suited 
to certain tasks, however, they have the ability to undergo other tasks which are 
usually undertaken by another region. A further example, which cannot be explained 
by the existence of modules, is the mind‟s capacity for an almost unlimited 
imagination (Siegert & Ward, 2002). It does not seem possible that something such 
as imagination can be confined to an informationally encapsulated module. 
Imagination consists of a wide variety of situations, which are often exaggerated. 
The modularity theory does not allow for many modules to interact with each other in 
the way which would be necessary for imagination to exist.  
It has been shown that the brain has to incorporate many varying inputs at one 
time and produce a suitable response. If all modules work separately without 
knowledge flowing between them, it seems an impossible task to produce a 
combined outcome. Fodor (1998) raises a similar point: 
 
For, eventually the mind has to integrate the results of all those modular 
computations and I don‟t see how there could be a module for doing 
that… Probably, modular computation doesn‟t explain how minds are 
rational; it‟s just a sort of precursor. It‟s what you have to work through to 
get a view of how horribly hard our rationality is to understand (p. 12). 
 
Thus, it is claimed that it is implausible to maintain that the brain has separate 
modules for every unique purpose which can arise.  
 
 
 
 
69 
 
 
 
 
7.2 Evolutionary psychology focuses too much on the Pleistocene period 
 
An argument put forward by evolutionary psychologists is that the human brain 
evolved its specific structures in response to solving adaptive problems in a period of 
time known as the Pleistocene period. To focus specifically on this of period the 
EEA, is seen as too restrictive by some theorists because it fails to take into account 
developments occurring outside this particular time frame, such as human cultural 
achievements, writing, etc. The argument for mental structural development 
happening solely within the Pleistocene period suffers the major problem that it is 
difficult to explain, without empirical evidence, how a particular evolutionary period 
might have affected the brain. As Panksepp and Panksepp (2000) remark:  
 
Although all evolutionists recognise that existing organisms are living 
historical „texts‟ that reflect past evolutionary passages, empirically we 
can only work effectively with the here and now brain/mind processes that 
are mixtures of evolutionary hand-me-downs and experiential 
blossoming. We can directly observe little more than strands of DNA, the 
proteins they help create, and the resulting developmental progression 
that takes place in certain environments. As is recognised by most, all 
historical/functional issues are largely hidden from direct analysis (p. 
113). 
 
Buller (2005) and Panksepp and Panksepp (200) raise strong criticisms of the 
heavy reliance on the EEA, which will be discussed below. Buller focuses on the 
brain‟s ability to undergo modification since the EEA and the effect the changing 
environment has on the brain. Panksepp and Panksepp focus on changes to the 
brain‟s mechanisms which could have occurred to the contemporary human.  
Buller (2005) initially addresses the issue that evolutionary psychologists focus 
to heavily on the EEA. He raises three points which he believes puts the plausibility 
of evolutionary psychological theory in question. These include the heavy reliance 
on the EEA, the claim that the brain has not evolved due to natural selection since 
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this period, and the issue that the brain has not evolved in response to the changing 
environment. The initial issue which Buller raised challenges the claim that the 
mechanisms in our brain have not had enough time over the last 400 generations 
since the EEA to develop new complex designs. It is true that selection could not 
have built new designs from scratch over this time span. However, the fact that a 
new complex design could not have evolved since the Pleistocene does not mean 
that the psychological mechanisms are the same in contemporary humans as they 
were in our ancestors in the EEA. The issue is whether old complex designs could 
have evolved and been modified since this period (Buller, 2005). Since evolutionary 
psychology does not address this question, it fails to show that our psychological 
adaptations have remained adapted to the Pleistocene environment. For Buller, 
evolutionary psychologists focus too much on the EEA and do not address the 
changes that may have occurred since. The idea that human psychological 
mechanisms cannot have evolved since the end of the EEA depends on a 
questionable assumption about the rate at which natural selection occurs (Buller, 
2005).  
Another issue relating to this is the fact that the environment has gone through 
some remarkable changes since the Pleistocene period. If our brain has evolved to 
respond to particular cues from a particular environment, then, if the environment 
has changed substantially over time, the cues and input will surely have also 
changed. Accordingly it would be expected that the psychological mechanisms 
which respond to these cues will have had to modify to accommodate the 
environmental changes. Substantial environmental change can be seen in 
populations that became agriculturalised and industrialised. Both of these two 
revolutions changed the human environment remarkably. Evolutionary psychologists 
argue that although the environments have changed, the problems raised by human 
social life have remained substantially the same. This is arguably false, as these two 
revolutions created huge changes in the group sizes and social structures of human 
populations, and these in turn changed the pressures placed on individuals (Buller, 
2005). Buller believes evolutionary psychologists have failed to completely rule out 
these possibilities and have not fully addressed them in their writings.  
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An additional speculation in relation to the reliance on the EEA was raised by 
Panksepp and Panksepp (2000) who also focus on the change in the brain that 
could have occurred over the 400 generations since the end of the Pleistocene. 
Their argument takes a different perspective from that of Buller; they believe that 
much of the brain evolution during the Pleistocene was based on the rapid 
expansion of general-purpose cortico-computational space (which permitted the 
emergence of foresight, hindsight and language) rather than on any fine-grained 
moulding of special-purpose socio-affective mechanisms. (Panksepp & Panksepp, 
2000). They suggest evolutionary psychologists should conduct research on species 
related to humans in order to gather more detailed information on how the brain 
evolved. Many animal husbandry practices and behavioural genetics experiments 
have indicated that it takes no more than half a dozen generations of selective 
breeding for robust temperamental differences to be induced into animal lines (Scott 
& Fuller, 1965; Segal, 1999). Thus we should not eliminate the possibility that a 
significant amount of phenotypic variability in humans may have been created by 
reproductive isolation or „caste‟ selective mating (Panksepp & Panksepp, 2000).  
 
7.3 There are other causes of evolutionary change other than natural  
selection 
 
The focused emphasis of evolutionary psychology on natural selection as the 
sole or major cause of human cognitive development can be criticised by looking to 
other causes of evolutionary development which sit alongside natural selection, 
many of which were described since Darwin‟s time. There are factors other than 
natural selection which result in evolutionary change. I will discuss two of them here: 
genetic drift and the phenomenon of spandrels.  
Genetic drift occurs in populations which break off from the main population 
and become isolated. In humans, the reasons for this can be both geographic and 
cultural. This is called “the founder effect”, and it has the effect of modifying the 
genetic make-up of the population concerned. The phenomenon of genetic drift is 
more important in small populations. As Griffiths et al (2004) mention, “the process 
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of genetic drift is, in fact, another way of looking at the inbreeding effect in small 
populations… Whether regarded as inbreeding or as random sampling of genes, the 
effect is the same. Populations do not exactly reproduce their genetic constitutions; 
there is a random component of gene-frequency change” (p. 704.). 
Another cause of evolutionary change is the phenomenon of spandrels. The 
existence of specific mental modules moulded over time by adaptive changes 
through the process of natural selection is claimed by evolutionary psychologists to 
be the basis of the human cognitive structure. This has been challenged by the 
notion that there are a significant number of evolutionary features which do not arise 
as adaptations but rather are co-opted by the organism because they have useful 
benefits. These „nonadaptive side effects‟, „epiphenomena‟, or „spandrels‟, which did 
not arise in the first place as adaptations, are believed to be much more common 
than genuinely specialised adaptive changes (Gould & Lewontin, 1979). According 
to Gould (1997), “natural selection made the human brain big, but most of our 
mental properties and potentials may be spandrels – that is, nonadaptive side 
consequences of building a device with such structural complexity… and therefore 
outside the compass of evolutionary psychology” (p. 21).  
The theory of spandrels can be seen to explain many higher cognitive activities 
in humans, and in fact an understanding of how spandrels work may help us to 
understand more clearly how recent human cultural activity may fit into evolutionary 
psychology‟s focus on natural selection within the Pleistocene period.  
 
7.4 The hypotheses of evolutionary psychology are little more than ‘just  
so’ stories 
 
We have shown that from the vantage points of the philosophy of science 
advocated by Lakatos, the evolutionary psychological meta-theory of natural 
selection does not need to be tested. It is taken as true, as is Newton's law of 
relativity. However some theorists (e.g., Buller, 2005) claim that in order for 
evolutionary psychology to be considered science, it needs to provide testable 
theories and empirical evidence. Scientific studies rely on empirical evidential data to 
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support their theories. Without such definitive information, the theories may be 
considered mere stories. Critics, such as Buller, cast doubt on the scientific status of 
evolutionary psychology; they claim, it is „untestable‟ (Gould, 2000), that it is 
„reductionist‟ (Rose, 1998), and that it relies on speculation about an environment of 
evolutionary adaptation about which we know very little. The heavy reliance on the 
EEA, which is largely untestable, leaves much room for criticism in relation to the 
„data‟, which support evolutionary psychology theories. Gould states „it is always 
easy to concoct a plausible story about how a trait may have evolved‟ (Gould, 2000). 
These stories, which do not contain empirical evidence, but rather, rely on 
assumptions, are often termed „just so stories‟. Gould (2000) discusses how 
speculation cannot be considered science and Pinker (2002) explains that 
evolutionary psychology must offer testable theories in order for this paradigm to be 
considered science.  
The palaeontologist Stephen J. Gould (2000) states that evolutionary 
psychology‟s reverse-engineering hypotheses about the existence of mental 
modules are often on a level of speculation similar to storytelling, with some 
similarity to Rudyard Kipling‟s highly fanciful, yet plausible explanations of natural 
phenomena. In other words, there is no way of empirically testing whether modules 
arose in response to specific environmental conditions within the period, of EEA, as 
such conditions are now inaccessible to study. Thus, it is concluded that 
evolutionary psychology is unscientific.  
The task of evolutionary psychology then turns into a speculative search for 
reasons why a behaviour that may harm us now must once have originated for 
adaptive purposes. To take an illustration proposed seriously by Robert Wright in 
The Moral Animal (Wright, 1994), a sweet tooth leads to unhealthy obesity today, 
however it must have arisen as an adaptation. Wright therefore comments that the 
classic example of an adaptation that has outlived its logic is the sweet tooth, as our 
fondness for sweetness was designed for an environment in which fruit existed, but 
candy did not. This ranks as pure guesswork; Wright presents no neurological 
evidence of a brain module for sweetness, and no paleontological data about 
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ancestral feeding. This "just-so story" therefore cannot stand as a "classic example 
of an adaptation" in any sense deserving the name of science. 
Stephen Pinker (2002) on the other hand sets forth the idea that such 
hypotheses can be shown to have empirical rigor, and that there are „good and bad‟ 
adaptationist explanations. As he notes: “evolutionary explanations should offer a 
rigorous engineering analysis of the phenomenon of interest and yield testable 
predictions that can be evaluated empirically, in the lab or in the world at large” (p. 
95). Pinker‟s model of research is the more clear-cut example of visual perception, 
where a reverse-engineering approach is obviously appropriate (we know the eye 
was designed for the purpose of sight). If evolutionary psychology is to be accepted 
into the mainstream of psychological research, it must offer testable theories that 
can be verified or disproven. As Grossman and Kaufman (2001) note, “evolutionary 
psychology‟s storytelling must be joined with a commitment to empiricism” (p. 22).  
In summary, because we cannot directly observe natural selection in 
operation, and therefore cannot gather empirical data concerning genetic variation 
and reproductive success, we cannot definitively demonstrate that any specified 
characteristic is actually an adaptation and thus open to an evolutionary explanation 
(Haig & Durrant, 2001).  The suggestion from critics is that evolutionary explanations 
are untestable and therefore in the realm of storytelling.  They claim that we cannot 
have assurance that a characteristic is really an adaptation (Haig and Durrant, 
2001). 
 
7.5 Evolutionary psychology is reductionist 
 
Evolutionary psychology uses evolutionary theory to explain the human mind 
and behaviour. Some psychologists argue that because of its reliance on specific 
modules, evolutionary psychological theory cannot cover all aspects of the human 
mind and behaviour. This has led to accusations of reductionism, which involves 
breaking down systems into their smallest parts in order to explain phenomena.   
Evolutionary psychology explains the complex nature of human behaviour in 
terms of specific mental modules, which arose as adaptations in our hunter-gatherer 
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past. This is traditional reductionism – the breaking down of complex phenomena 
into components. Reductionism is regarded as essential in most areas of science, 
however critics of reductionism in psychology hold the belief that different levels of 
explanation are required for explaining different levels of human behaviour (Siegart 
& Ward, 2002). For instance, explaining the jealousy of a mate by talking about 
atoms and neurons would not make sense. The emotion involves complex 
integrations between various brain regions, and is dependent on the specific person 
and situation. Each complex level involves new interactions between component 
parts, which cannot be inferred by taking the system to pieces. For example, in 
social psychology, the focus may be on group dynamics and interactions, and on 
processes such as social categorisation. While these phenomena must reflect in 
some way the activity of the nervous system of each member, it is highly unlikely 
that meaningful explanations of such phenomena can be made at the micro level 
(Siegart & Ward, 2002) as it is at an inappropriate level of explanation. Even if we 
could detail the specific events that occurred in each individual‟s nervous system, it 
seems impossible that such descriptions could be combined to account for the 
phenomena of human social behaviour.  
Scientists continue to believe that the science of human nature has to be 
understood at several levels of analysis, not just the lowest level (Pinker, 2002). 
Chomsky, Marr and Tinbergen have each marked out a set of levels of analysis for 
understanding the mind.  These levels include: its function, its real-time operation, 
how it is implemented in neural tissue, how it develops in the individual, and how it 
evolved in the species.  Its function includes what it accomplishes in an evolutionary 
sense and its real-time operation is concerned with how the mind works proximately 
from moment-to-moment (Pinker, 2002).  An example is language, specifically how 
language is based on grammar designed to communicate limitless thoughts. It is 
used by people today via memory recall and rule adherence. Language is 
implemented in a network of regions which must coordinate memory, planning, word 
meaning, and grammar.  If any of these factors is omitted, the result would be a 
linguistic mess.  The English language was shaped by broad historical events that 
certainly did not take place in a single head and it is constantly changing every 
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generation (Pinker, 2002). Wittgenstein (1958) has also pointed out the impossibility 
of a private language. Thus it is said that culture and society influence the language 
we know.  For this to happen, the brain must also incorporate regions involved in 
culture when using language.  Thus, it would be completely illogical to try to 
understand language at its lowest level because it has connections with social, 
cultural and linguistic factors. 
It appears that evolutionary psychologists dumb down the complex richness of 
their subject matter into a genetic mess of neurons, genes and evolutionary urges 
(Pinker, 2002).  It is not possible to explain the causes of such events as World War 
I through motions of atoms, electrons and quarks.  An integrated level of explanation 
is required.   
 
7.6 The political conservatism of evolutionary psychology 
 
Evolutionary psychology‟s relationship to ethics is a continual topic of debate. It 
is argued by some critics (Holcomb, 2004) that, in its focus on the functional 
organisation of the brain, and on the existence of an innate, unchangeable „human 
nature‟, evolutionary psychology is guilty of genetic determinism and of providing a 
moral justification for some innately conservative political ideas. 
The immediate background to, and reason for, these concerns is the way in 
which, since Darwin, theories of evolution have been co-opted by conservative 
political governments to justify some of the twentieth century‟s most chilling 
atrocities, for example, the treatment of Jews by Nazi Germany, and lesser, although 
no less significant, attempts at social engineering such as the forced sterilization of 
the physically or intellectually disabled, and ideological assumptions around racial, 
gender or class-based differences in intellectual ability. There is no doubt that 
various misunderstandings of Darwinian theory have occurred in recent history, 
however this does not necessarily mean that any focus on the social aspects of 
evolution will fall into such traps. One of the main factors presented as evidence that 
evolutionary psychology is biased in such a way is that it falls into the trap of stating 
that certain human traits are justifiable because they are “naturally” occurring. That 
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is, evolutionary psychology is committing the „naturalistic fallacy‟ by deriving moral 
norms from evolutionary theory. The naturalistic fallacy occurs when one assumes 
that „what is‟, is the same as „what ought‟ to be (Rossano, 2003). Thus, one may 
think that if a phenomenon occurs in nature, then it is morally right. This is most 
avidly seen around issues of gender difference, which evolutionary psychology is 
often accused of rendering in a very narrow, conservative, and biologically 
deterministic manner, reflecting a hidden bias which reflects current cultural values.  
As Durrant (1988) states, “research directed at identifying and elucidating sex 
differences is not implicitly sexist in nature, nor do evolutionary scientists typically 
claim that current differences between men and women in society reflect inevitable 
patterns of diferentiation” (Durrant, 1998, p. 155). The constant interchange between 
environment and genetics is also seen to modify behaviours. For example, nepotism 
may be considered a human trait which evolved to increase inclusive fitness, 
however there is no reason to suppose that evolutionary psychology believes 
nepotism is morally good merely because it states its existence as an adaptive 
human trait. In fact, current research suggests a model in which the naturalistic 
fallacy is absent, and there is room to separate adaptive behaviour from moral 
imperatives:  
 
Recent cultural changes toward social equality are changing the 
opportunities that provide the range of options for evolved strategies to 
take. They are leading to men‟s greater concern with their looks and 
women‟s greater concern with work. These cultural changes are biological 
changes… Nepotism at work is an outcome of an evolutionary constant 
(caring for our family) that we want to change. We can enact policies that 
interact with out evolved psychological mechanisms to either increase or 
decrease nepotism (or other traits)… This is a real-life issue in states 
such as Kentucky, in which powerful county administrators suggest 
appointments of their kin to the few available high quality jobs. (Holcomb, 
2004, p. 75)     
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CONCLUSION 
 
Evolutionary psychology offers a new paradigm and novel conceptual tools to 
integrate psychology with the rest of science. The adaptationist explanations offered 
by evolutionary psychology are showing considerable promise in a number of areas 
(e.g., mate selection, social behaviour, emotion, abnormal behaviour; see Gaulin & 
McBurney, 2004). Moreover, evolutionary psychology can claim to be better science 
than the more problematic SSSM approach. With increased methodological rigor, 
and better scientific practices, evolutionary psychology has the potential to provide a 
more useful understanding of the human mind and behaviour than the SSSM. With 
other scholars (e.g., Bjorklund, 1997; Lykken, 1991; Richters, 1997) contending that 
the greatest obstacle to psychology‟s development as a science is the absence of a 
sound and agreed-upon meta-theory, a further consideration of evolutionary theory 
as the appropriate meta-theory for psychology is desirable. Evolutionary theory 
could become the unifying theoretical paradigm in the psychological sciences. This 
thesis endeavored to demonstrate how evolutionary psychology integrates with the 
rest of science in order to provide the most useful explanations of the human mind 
and behavior. In accordance with this aim, the primary tasks for this study were to 
set out the reasons why evolutionary psychology deems the SSSM an inadequate 
model of human behavior, to demonstrate the ways evolutionary psychology uses 
evolutionary theory to provide an ultimate explanation of human behavior, and to 
explain how evolutionary psychology integrates with the rest of science in order to 
provide more rigorous explanations of human behavior. 
The thesis began by focusing on the first of these tasks, initially elaborating on 
the SSSM‟s main arguments: that the brain is a blank slate, that culture plays the 
major part in human behavior, and that learning mechanisms are general-purpose. 
The SSSM has dominated psychology for nearly a century, but it cannot fully explain 
human behaviour. For example, mate selection cannot be said to be culturally 
specific; rather, it is a cross-cultural phenomenon. Gradually evolutionary 
psychology developed a range of criticisms to address the inadequacy of the SSSM. 
This critique focused initially on the impossibility of a „blank slate‟ view of human 
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development, for instance that it is doubtful that human beings are not already set up 
for the experience of learning language. Secondly, evolutionary psychology analyzes 
the false-dichotomy put in place between nature and nurture by the SSSM, instead 
looking at the way that nature and nurture work together in the development of traits, 
specifically how genes work with the environment. Thirdly, it was argued that the 
claim by the SSSM that environmental effects can be explained by general laws of 
learning is inadequate, and that it is instead more likely that there are innate 
mechanisms interacting with environmental input to produce behaviour. The focus 
then moved to the division which the SSSM places between the natural and social 
sciences, arguing that an understanding of biology is crucial for any understanding 
of evolved cognitive mechanisms. The failure of the SSSM to place importance on 
scientific principles, particularly those of biology, leads to a lack of focus on natural 
selection, which evolutionary psychology attempts to address by placing natural 
selection at the centre of its inquiry.  Lastly, the lack of an overarching theory of 
design is seen as a flaw of the SSSM. There are a range of disciplines, such as 
evolutionary biology, human development, and cognitive science, which the SSSM 
does not draw on in its quest to understand human behaviour. A more integrated 
theory is needed, one which takes into account how science‟s role in psychology 
might function. 
Having set out the inadequacies of the SSSM model, and isolated the need for 
a more integrated approach which included science, this thesis then turned to 
evolutionary theory, and the ways in which evolutionary psychology applies this 
theory to achieve this aim. Overviews of natural selection and sexual selection are 
set out in order to clarify evolutionary biology‟s importance to evolutionary 
psychology. The causal mechanism of natural selection is seen as crucial to any 
understanding of how the brain has evolved over time to maximise individual survival 
and increase reproductive success. Sexual selection, as a factor within the process 
of natural selection, is additionally seen as important in the understanding of how 
organisms evolve traits which are not directly connected to individual survival, but 
serve to help reproductive success. With this established, the thesis then went on to 
introduce the major aims and principles of evolutionary psychology, beginning with 
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an introduction which set out the increased disciplinary focus that evolutionary 
psychology brought to the field of psychology and the study of human behaviour by 
including principles and theories from biology and evolutionary theory.  Past 
attempts to integrate psychology and evolutionary theory have not met with success, 
because the integration focused on the level of behaviour. Evolutionary psychology, 
on the other hand, shifts the emphasis from behaviour by focusing its inquiry on the 
existence of evolved psychological mechanisms, the development of which are seen 
as the key to understanding behaviour. As Toobey (1997) suggests, natural 
selection cannot select for behaviour, only for the mechanism which would produce 
that behaviour. The aims of evolutionary psychology were then specified: firstly that 
it employs the notion of both proximate and distal explanations, the former being 
concerned with how an organism‟s behaviour manifests, and the latter being 
concerned with why the psychological mechanism which caused the behaviour 
might have evolved through natural and sexual selection. This was then discussed in 
terms of how a better integration of the natural and social sciences might be 
achieved. Discussion then moved to the specific ways in which evolutionary 
psychology combines evolutionary biology and cognitive psychology. This is 
important, because without the insight which these disciplines provide, the 
functioning of evolved psychological mechanisms could not be understood. In 
particular, the physical functioning of these mechanisms was enhanced by insights 
into computational functioning in the brain, and the idea of human mental processes 
being akin to a series of information processing mechanisms. This is turn was 
discussed as being a crucial difference between evolutionary psychology and 
sociobiology, both of which have a core focus on evolutionary theory. The focus on 
fitness maximisation in sociobiology is seen, from an evolutionary psychology 
perspective, to account inadequately for the ways in which ends do not always follow 
from means; in other words, how behaviour functions not to merely maximise 
individual fitness, but how the existence of adaptive mechanisms function to produce 
that behaviour. The core theses of evolutionary psychology were then set out. 
Computationalism was discussed in greater detail, with the efforts of cognitive 
psychologists to understand the mind as an information processing machine 
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considered as an important insight in the development of evolutionary psychology. In 
this model, the human mind, conceived as a set of evolved information-processing 
mechanisms, takes input from the environment, processes it, and generates output 
as behaviour. However, cognitive programs still need to be selected by the process 
of adaptation, which is the process through which natural selection produces various 
designs in order to increase reproductive fitness. This is a process which is 
deliberate, slow, and costly, and whose results can be seen as the sum total of the 
adaptations human beings exhibit. The relationship between the development of 
human cognitive structures and the need to find adaptative solutions for 
environmental problems was then discussed. In the evolutionary psychology model, 
we cannot understand mental functions without understanding the environmental 
inputs which created evolved traits as solutions to problems.  The environment 
selects for survival, and it is the environment which has produced many of the 
adaptations now found in human beings. Human cognitive structures are seen as 
originating in the EEA, in particular the Pleistocene period. Discussion considered 
computational input-output, adaptationism and the role of the EEA, and the factors 
that evolutionary psychology can then understand the nature of human 
psychological mechanisms. The human cognitive mechanisms which have evolved 
are seen as modular. Compared to a „general purpose‟ theory of human mental 
architecture, modularity suggests that there are specific and unique functions to 
various modules in the brain, which have evolved in response to specific problems to 
be solved. These modules are considered to be informationally incapsulated; the 
module for mate selection, for example, cannot be used for food choice or for the 
fear of snakes for example. Evolutionary psychology is faced with the challenge of 
how to understand the functionality of psychological mechanisms, which is not as 
straightforward as understanding the functionality of anatomical structures in the 
human body, such as the liver or the heart. These can be seen physically in surgical 
procedures. The mind‟s functioning, however, has to be approached by different 
means. Evolutionary psychology employs the strategy of reverse engineering in 
order to solve this problem. This is the attempt to decipher a machine‟s function by 
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looking at its structure and hypothesising what functions this structure was designed 
to fit. 
Building on this knowledge, a case study of human mate selection behaviour 
was utilised to illustrate the principles of evolutionary psychology, and the ways in 
which empirical evidence has been gathered by its methodologies. Reverse 
engineering is employed by evolutionary psychologists to identify the principles 
driving human mate selection. This procedure has shown how specific strategies for 
mate selection, which seem present across cultures, evolved via natural selection in 
hunter gatherer times to create adaptations that have increased the chances of 
reproduction. Mate selection is supplemented by the theory of parental investment to 
further explain these behaviours, creating a set of circumstances which adequately 
predicts the existence of human jealousy as an adaptive trait. 
This thesis then argued that there is a need for empirical research as a core 
part of science. The inability to empirically test the EEA is problematic for 
evolutionary psychology. A discussion of philosophy of science was conducted in 
order to understand whether the discipline of evolutionary psychology can be seen 
as scientific.  A comparison between Poppers‟ and Lakatos‟ theories was conducted 
in order to understand how evolutionary psychology can utilise philosophy of science 
in order to develop the conceptual tools to integrate psychology effectively with other 
relevant sciences. A reliance on Popper‟s theory, which emphasises falsification, 
was seen as not particularly useful for advancing knowledge about complex 
psychological processes which are the focus of evolutionary psychology. Lakatos‟ 
approximating approach, which is comprised of two central features was outlined, 
that meta-theoretical research programmes are comprised of several levels of 
analysis and that they adhere to a criterion of research progressiveness. Here it was 
explained that a hard core of basic assumptions surround a protective belt of middle 
level theories and auxiliary hypotheses, which are in turn connected to observable 
data. Auxiliary hypotheses surround the basic assumptions and these hypotheses 
are empirically tested and adjusted and readjusted in order to defend the hard core; 
thus, it is not the basic assumptions of the research programme that are adjusted 
and readjusted. Rather, scientists actually rely on the hard core basic assumptions 
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as a starting point for constructing and evaluating theories, and they seek to solve 
problems by modifying the more peripheral assumptions of the protective belt rather 
than the hard core basic assumptions.    
With this groundwork laid, the question as to how the integration of psychology 
and science could best be conducted, via an overriding integrative model, was 
considered. I argued that the mehods and strategies that evolutionary psychologists 
utilise to generate and test hypotheses are scientifically defensible. They are 
defensible because they are in line with a Lakatosian philosophy of science, a more 
contemporary philosophy of science than Popper‟s. I outlined how these 
explanations are more useful compared to general psychological explanations which 
rely on Popperian philosophy of science, and, as such, suggested they should be 
adopted. I further outlined how the specifics of Lakatos‟s approach (i.e., its multiple 
levels of explanation and its criterion of research progressiveness) applied to 
evolutionary psychology and how this approach was considered scientific. 
The thesis then presented the major current criticisms of evolutionary 
psychology from various standpoints, and attempted to address these criticisms. The 
first of these was the criticism of domain-specific modularity, which is important to 
evolutionary psychology precisely because it is this feature which makes it a 
candidate for being integrated with the biological sciences. The criticism of 
modularity comes from neuroscientific insight into brain plasticity, where it is 
sometimes observed that the brain will regenerate after injury, with different regions 
of brain tissue taking on the function of tissues which have been lost. Further 
criticism comes from those who consider modularity to be an overcompensation for 
earlier conceptions of the brain as a general purpose mechanism.  The second 
criticism of evolutionary psychology is that it focuses too much on the EEA. This was 
seen as limiting because human history has developed much since this time, and a 
backward-looking theory may not take into account developments since the 
Pleistocene period. The third critique of evolutionary psychology was that it puts sole 
emphasis on natural selection as the driving force of evolutionary change, and fails 
to take other forces into account, such as genetic drift and the existence of 
spandrels. A fourth criticism was that the inability to test hypotheses developed 
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around adaptive traits evolving in the EEA renders evolutionary psychology 
unscientifically testable, with its theories being little more than „just so stories‟. The 
fifth criticism of evolutionary psychology was that its theories reduce the complexity 
of mental functioning by treating the complex interaction of different  levels of human 
behaviour as explainable purely by breaking them down into components. Lastly, the 
controversies which attend evolutionary psychology, in which it is seen from the 
perspective of a variety of disciplines as being politically conservative, were 
discussed, as was the difference between uses of evolutionary theory to support 
negative social stratification and evolutionary psychology‟s quest to provide 
adequate explanations for evolved mental structures.  
 
The goal of this study was to explain not just why evolutionary psychology 
remains merely a sub-discipline of psychology, but also to show why evolutionary 
theory provides a meta-theoretical framework within which to examine the whole 
field of psychology. As Buss remarks, “although psychologists assume that the mind 
is a whole and integrated unity, no metatheory subsumes, integrates, unites, or 
connects the disparate pieces that psychologists gauge with their different 
callipers…An important new theoretical paradigm called „evolutionary psychology‟ is 
emerging that offers to provide this metatheory” (1995, p.1).  
The emergence of evolutionary psychology is not surprising when we consider 
that the primary subject matter of psychology is the behaviour and mind of biological 
organisms. What is perhaps surprising is that this emergence has taken so long. 
Biological science has been unified by the theory of evolution since the 1930's (i.e., 
since the integration of Darwin's theory with that of population genetics). Curiously, 
this was about the time that the social sciences began seriously to reject biological 
determinism (e.g., Watson's Behaviourism) in favour of what became the SSSM. As 
the social science pendulum begins to swing once more in the direction of biological 
determinism, psychology is perhaps more ready to accept the unification and 
integration with biological science promised by evolutionary psychology.  
As I have shown, the critics and criticisms of this new discipline are many, but if 
we accept Max Planck's (1949) caution that “a new scientific truth does not triumph 
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by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its 
opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it” (p. 
35.), then future generations of psychologists may yet begin their studies with 
Darwin's great unifying theory in mind.
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